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ABSTRACT 
  This Article highlights the hazards of hindsight analysis of the 
causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New 
Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
particularly on the theory that the levee failures were “caused” by a 
1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that 
resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article 
provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process 
that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, 
focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the 
“standard project hurricane” risk assessment model that lay at the 
heart of the Army Corps of Engineers’ decisionmaking process. The 
Article then offers a detailed analysis of how and why Hurricane 
Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis 
demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a 
meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. 
Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. 
The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the 
attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a 
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disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the 
variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may 
flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter 
of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort 
environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the 
parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when planning a 
hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sunk 
New Orleans” when attempting to allocate responsibility for the 
plan’s failure some forty years later.  
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]here are only two kinds of levees, those that have failed and 
those that will fail.”1 
The failure of the New Orleans levees to prevent waters from 
Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, and the Gulf of Mexico from 
flooding the city during Hurricane Katrina led to one of the worst 
disasters in this country’s history. Although many other causes for the 
human suffering and economic loss that followed in the wake of 
Katrina have been identified and debated, no one disputes the causal 
connection between the flooding and the failure of the levees. Had 
the levees been differently designed, constructed, and/or maintained, 
the flooding would not have occurred. The critical question of why 
the levees failed, however, has generated considerable disagreement. 
Although the casual observer might assume that this is primarily a 
question for engineering experts, a complete answer may also require 
a careful reconstruction of the planning history of the levee system 
and of the role that federal budgetary policy, environmental 
litigation, and other public policy developments played in the 
system’s complex evolution. 
In the heated political aftermath of Katrina, the analysis has 
been further complicated by the perhaps unavoidable tendency of 
participants in public policy debates to conflate causation with fault 
and to play the “blame game.” Prominently featured in Katrina’s 
immediate political aftermath was the claim that the levee system 
would have protected New Orleans had local fishermen and an 
 
 1. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, HURRICANES KATRINA & RITA: USING 
MITIGATION TO REBUILD A SAFER GULF COAST 4 (2005), available at http://www.floods.org/ 
PDF/ASFPM_HurricaneKatrina_WhitePaper_090905.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (reporting a 
saying common among U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff). 
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environmental group not filed a lawsuit in the late 1970s under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 In particular, critics 
argue that because a federal district court responded to this suit by 
enjoining the levee project pending the preparation of an adequate 
environmental impact statement (EIS), the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers ultimately abandoned its original design for the 
New Orleans levees and adopted instead an alternative design that is 
said to have been less capable of protecting the city from the storm 
surge created by Katrina. In other words, some commentators 
contend that, as a result of the lawsuit, the Corps redesigned the 
project in a way that failed to protect the city. 
This Article evaluates the claim that the 1970s environmental 
lawsuit caused—in any meaningful sense—the destruction of New 
Orleans in 2005. Although correct answers to many engineering 
questions are critical to this analysis, the Article does not attempt to 
resolve those technical questions. It relies instead on preliminary 
reports produced by various groups of engineers that have analyzed 
the failures of particular levees. The Article also avoids, to the extent 
possible, other sociopolitical explanations for the levee failures that 
were featured in the post-Katrina blame game, such as the failure of 
the George W. Bush Administration and its predecessors to request 
sufficient appropriations to build and maintain levees and the role 
played by alleged mismanagement within the special New Orleans 
levee districts.3 Focusing exclusively on the environmental lawsuit 
claim, this Article attempts to probe at a deeper level the difficulty of 
retrospective analysis, in the hope that the discussion might prove 
helpful in the examination not only of the levee failures, but also of 
those other potentially contributing causes. Just as the “lawsuit that 
drowned New Orleans” turns out to be oversimplified and 
misleading, other attempts to pin responsibility for the Katrina levee 
failure on any single act or omission are likely to obscure the broader 
lessons of the tragedy. 
In that respect, scrutinizing the role of the NEPA lawsuit in the 
Katrina levee failures also sheds some important light on the 
 
 2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–4335, 4341–4347 
(2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of 
Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 113–14 (2006) (observing numerous pre-Katrina 
warnings of the inadequacy of the existing storm surge protection system); Andrew Martin & 
Andrew Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2005, at 7. 
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challenges facing government disaster policy from the forward-
looking perspective. The same problems of uncertainty and 
complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute 
causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to 
predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially 
disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Thus, in order to 
guard against catastrophic potentialities in the future—whether of 
economic, environmental, or human loss—one must keep firmly in 
mind not only the hazards of hindsight, but also the foibles of 
foresight. 
The next Part of this Article provides a detailed historical 
reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New 
Orleans storm surge protection system, highlighting the relevant 
litigation brought against the Corps of Engineers by various local 
interests, including the environmental action group Save Our 
Wetlands.4 Part I ultimately analyzes how and why Katrina overcame 
the storm surge protection system. Part II then uses tort law’s but-for 
causation doctrine to introduce the blame game that has been played 
post-Katrina by policymakers, politicians, and various others. Part III 
considers in depth the counterfactual scenario of a levee planning 
process absent the NEPA lawsuit, in order to construct a hindsight 
analysis of the likely causal role played by Save Our Wetlands in the 
flooding of New Orleans. Lessons about forecasting risk and 
appropriately preparing for future calamities are drawn from the 
foregoing analysis in Part IV. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE LEVEE SYSTEM 
Because New Orleans is situated in the delta formed at the 
mouth of the Mississippi River, it has long maintained a flood control 
system to protect it from the risks of flooding from the Mississippi 
River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, and Lake Borgne 
and the Gulf of Mexico to the east.5 The levee system that surrounded 
New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provided by far the most 
 
 4. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, No. 75-3710, slip op. (E.D. La. 1977), http://www. 
saveourwetlands.org/77-schwartz.htm. 
 5. R.B. SEED ET AL., CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. RESEARCH IN THE INTEREST OF SOC’Y, 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEE SYSTEMS IN 
HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUG. 29, 2005, at 1-2 (2005), http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_ 
orleans/report/PRELIM.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); Mark Fischetti, Drowning New 
Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 1, 2001, at 76, 78. 
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sophisticated and powerful protection in the city’s long history. 
Katrina demonstrated, however, that an even more sophisticated and 
powerful flooding and storm surge protection system will be needed 
to protect the city in the future. In particular, because of its unique 
topographical setting, the city of New Orleans will always be at risk 
from a catastrophic failure of the levee systems that have grown up 
around it, if levees are to remain the city’s primary form of defense. 
Indeed, the risk will only increase as the city continues to subside and 
the protective wetlands between it and the Gulf of Mexico continue 
to diminish.6 
In addition to its Gulf storm surge protection projects, the Corps 
of Engineers also designed and constructed the levee system that 
protects New Orleans from the periodic Mississippi River flooding 
that typically occurs during springtime. The risk of flooding from the 
Mississippi River stems largely from flood waters moving down the 
river as a result of rainfall events that may take place hundreds of 
miles to the north of the city. The primary line of defense against 
river flooding is an extensive system of levees and dikes that extends 
along the length of the river as it flows through Louisiana. That 
system, which contains the city’s highest levees, averaging 25 feet 
above sea level in height, was not involved in the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster.7 Although one misinformed participant in the blame game 
following the Katrina disaster erroneously attributed the New 
Orleans flooding to an environmental lawsuit involving the 
Mississippi River levees (200 miles upstream, no less),8 most of the 
critical attention to environmental litigation in the wake of Katrina 
has focused instead on the levee system that protects New Orleans 
from sea storm surge. Unlike the Mississippi River flood protection 
system, those levees did not perform during Katrina as they were 
designed to do. Accordingly, the discussion hereafter will focus 
exclusively on those levees, rather than the Mississippi River flood 
protection system. 
Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne are located side-by-side to 
the north and northeast of the city and are separated by a narrow 
 
 6. Fischetti, supra note 5, at 78. 
 7. Bob Marshall, Levee System Along River Held Its Ground in Storm, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Jan. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 8. R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Commentary, Eco-Catastrophe Echoes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2005, at A19, available at http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20050915-090259-2463r.htm 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
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strip of land that allows water to flow between the lakes through two 
narrow passes northeast of the city at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur 
(see Figure 1).9 Although Lake Borgne is separated from developed 
areas of the city by a large area of open swampland, Lake 
Pontchartrain immediately borders the downtown and western parts 
of the city.10 The primary flood risk from the lakes occurs in the late 
summer and fall during tropical storms and hurricanes. Surges in 
Lake Pontchartrain pose the greatest risk to the downtown area, and 
surges in Lake Borgne primarily threaten New Orleans East and St. 
Bernard Parish to the east of the downtown area. An interconnected 
series of levees protects the city from storm surges in the lakes. These 
levees are considerably smaller than the ones that line the Mississippi 
River, ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height. 
Figure 1.  New Orleans Hurricane Protection with Hurricane Katrina 



















 9. A map of the lakes and levees prepared by the Times-Picayune staff can be found 
online. Last Line of Defense: Hoping the Levees Hold, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/ 
hurricane/popup/nolalevees_jpg.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Last Line of 
Defense]. 
 10. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-2. 
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Because much of the land mass of New Orleans is below sea level 
and continues to sink, rainwater that flows into the city must be 
removed not by natural drainage, but by huge pumps that force the 
water to move northward along three man-made canals, called 
“outfall” or “drainage” canals, into Lake Pontchartrain. Named for 
the streets that they parallel (17th Street, London Avenue, and 
Orleans Avenue), the canals are lined with levees and concrete 
floodwalls that prevent the water from spilling into the city.11 In some 
places, water flowing through the canals is nearly as high as the 
rooftops of houses in the surrounding neighborhoods.12 All of these 
levees were built by contractors working for the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and, like all of the levees protecting the city, are 
maintained by various local levee districts.13 
In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps of Engineers during 
the twentieth century constructed three large and interconnected 
“navigation” canals to permit oceangoing vessels to move from the 
Mississippi River through the city north to Lake Pontchartrain, 
northeast to the Intercoastal Waterway that connects ports along the 
entire Gulf Coast, and south to the Gulf of Mexico. The Inner Harbor 
Navigation Canal (often referred to by the local population as the 
“Industrial Canal”) slices north–south across the city between the 
river and Lake Pontchartrain at the point where they are closest to 
each other. The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects 
the Industrial Canal at right angles and travels east–west to a point in 
St. Bernard Parish where it forms a “Y” with the Intercoastal 
Waterway. From the Y, the Intercoastal Waterway moves to the 
northeast and the MRGO Canal continues in a southeasterly 
direction to the Gulf of Mexico.14 Like the outfall canals, the shipping 
canals are all confined by earthen levees and concrete floodwalls. 
The levee systems effectively divide the city and surrounding 
developed areas into four large protected basins called “polders,” 
each of which is protected by its own perimeter levee system.15 Thus, 
the land within one polder can flood while the land remaining within 
other polders remains protected. In the devastating Katrina flood, 
 
 11. Id. at 2-1. 
 12. Last Line of Defense, supra note 9. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. R.B. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-3. The word “polder” is a Dutch word that means 
“a contiguous land unit protected by a perimeter levee system.” Id. at 1-2. 
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however, levees in all of the polders failed, and some or all of the land 
within each was flooded. Land located in the crescent bordering the 
Mississippi River at the south end of the downtown area is above sea 
level and therefore was not flooded. 
A. Levee Planning and Construction History 
The system just described grew out of a reevaluation of the 
protections that had failed when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans 
in September 1965. Reacting to the devastating flooding which 
resulted from that storm, Congress authorized a massive hurricane 
protection improvement effort called the Lake Pontchartrain and 
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) to provide 
hurricane protection to all of the Greater New Orleans metropolitan 
area.16 To implement this statute, the Corps of Engineers carefully 
studied two major options—the “high level” option and the “barrier” 
option. 
1. The “High Level” and “Barrier” Options.  The “high level” 
option consisted simply of raising all of the existing levees and, where 
necessary, constructing new levees to a height that would prevent 
flooding that could result from the standard project hurricane (SPH), 
a hypothetical hurricane that was used to guide Corps levee design 
and that loosely represented the most extreme hurricane that would 
be expected to hit New Orleans every 200 to 300 years.17 Although 
experts later determined that the model hurricane could not possibly 
occur in the real world,18 it was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving 
 
 16. Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Water Resources, 95th Cong. 20 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings] 
(testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New 
Orleans); see also U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE PROTECTION: 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEVEE MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN PROJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 4 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, 
HURRICANE PROTECTION]. 
 17. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 21 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III, 
District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans). For an extended discussion of 
the SPH, see infra Part IV.A. 
 18. John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a 
Greater Threat from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 2002, at 
J12 (“Meteorologists today say the Standard Project Hurricane could not exist in nature.”). 
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Category Three storm on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale.19 In 
practice, the high level plan for protection against the SPH would 
have resulted in raising the levees from between 9.3 and 13.5 feet 
above sea level to between 16 and 18.5 feet above sea level.20 The 
assumption was, of course, that the levees would be properly designed 
and constructed to withstand all storm surges that did not exceed 
those levels. 
Under the “barrier” option, the Corps would have constructed 
levees along the far eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain, where it 
flows into Lake Borgne and ultimately the Gulf of Mexico through 
two relatively narrow channels at the Rigolets pass and Chef Menteur 
pass (see Figure 2). The Corps would also have constructed structures 
at the two passes containing massive gates that would have allowed 
water to flow back and forth between the lakes, but that would have 
been closed when hurricanes approached.21 Finally, the Corps would 
have built a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control 
structure at the point at which the Industrial Canal enters Lake 
Pontchartrain. The gates would have been closed during hurricanes to 
prevent water from entering the Industrial Canal from Lake 
Pontchartrain.22 The Corps believed that the levees and the barrier 
structure would prevent the storm surges that precede hurricanes 
from crossing from Lake Bourne into Lake Pontchartrain.23 
Consequently, the levees bordering the city along Lake Pontchartrain 
would be fortified, but not significantly raised as under the alternative 
plan. Still, like the high level option, the barrier option was designed 
to protect against the SPH.24 
2. First Choice: The Barrier Option.  The high level option had 
several drawbacks from the perspective of Corps officials, including 
the need to obtain rights-of-way for additional land near the levees to 
 
 19. Id.; Jerry Mitchell, E-Mail Suggests Government Seeking to Blame Groups, MISS. 
CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1; see GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra 
note 16, at 1. 
 20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS 
OF THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY, LOUISIANA, HURRICANE PROTECTION 
PROJECT 3 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 GAO REPORT]. 
 21. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 22–24, 33–36 (testimony of Colonel Early J. 
Rush III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans). 
 22. Id. at 22. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM 
188 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:179 
allow them to be widened and raised. In addition, the high level plan 
would not have prevented the flooding of some industrial areas and 
potentially developable wetlands located outside the existing 
downtown polder between the levees and the lake to the northeast of 
the city.25 The Corps therefore decided to implement the barrier 
option.26 To speed the project along, the Orleans Levee Board 
financed and constructed portions of the Industrial Canal floodwalls, 
and this relatively inexpensive aspect of the project was virtually 
completed by 1973.27 Work on the barrier structures and levees 
running from New Orleans to the those structures, however, was 
greatly delayed because the local interests who were responsible for 
obtaining the rights-of-way that the Corps needed to construct the 
levees did not always agree with the Corps’ construction priorities.28 
In 1976, a coalition of local fishermen and an environmental 
group called Save Our Wetlands sued the Corps of Engineers, 
alleging that the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) 
prepared for the project was inadequate.29 On December 30, 1977, a 
federal district court agreed, issuing an injunction that prevented the 
Corps from conducting any further work on the barrier project until it 
had prepared an adequate FEIS. The injunction was subsequently 
modified to permit continued construction of the levees between the 
lake and the city of New Orleans.30 
 
 25. Id. at 21. 
 26. DONALD T. HORNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BROKEN LEVEES: 
WHY THEY FAILED 4 (2005), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Special_Levee_ 
Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 1976 GAO Report, supra note 20, at 16. 
 29. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 5. 
 30. Id. 
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3. Second Choice: The High Level Plan.  After the injunction 
issued, the Corps reconsidered the costs and benefits of the barrier 
and high level options. It was at that time encountering additional 
opposition from local interests who were responsble for obtaining 
rights-of-way31 and citizens who saw the project as “a land grab that 
would personally enrich some of the civic leaders pushing hardest for 
it.”32 Additional opposition arose from representatives of areas on the 
Lake Borgne side of the barrier who likely would have been placed at 
greater risk of flooding during hurricanes, and who therefore felt the 
plan would foreclose economic development of their region.33 
The intense public opposition was in evidence during 
congressional hearings conducted in New Orleans the week after the 
 
 31. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. 
 32. Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, NAT’L J., Sept. 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907. 
 33. Id. 
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injunction issued. A spokesperson for the League of Women Voters 
argued that the Corps had never undertaken a study of the cost to 
taxpayers of maintaining the urbanization of wetlands that the project 
envisioned. She noted that the voters of New Orleans had defeated 
proposals to participate in financing the barrier project on three 
separate occasions, but had voted to approve a similar project without 
the barriers the previous year.34 An informal poll conducted by 
Representative Robert Livingston indicated that a substantial 
majority of the New Orleans citizens either opposed the project (38.5 
percent) or favored discontinuation until the studies could be 
completed (23.6 percent).35 Although not known for his antipathy to 
federally financed public works projects in his district, even 
Representative Livingston expressed considerable reservations about 
the wisdom of this particular project. The state representative from 
St. Tammany Parish, part of which was on the Lake Borgne side of 
the barrier project, warned that the project would put his parish at 
risk when the gates were closed because it would deflect the surge 
from Lake Borgne into St. Tammany Parish.36 
By 1982, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers had 
changed its mind. It now favored the high level plan “because it 
would cost less than the barrier plan” and would “have fewer 
detrimental effects on Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.”37 
Undoubtedly, one of the factors underlying the changed cost 
assessment was the delay in obtaining rights-of-way from local 
interests who disagreed with the Corps’ construction priorities.38 The 
Corps made a final decision to proceed with the high level plan in 
1985. Although nearly seven years had passed between the issuance 
of the injunction and the Corps’ ultimate decision to abandon the 
barrier plan, the project was substantially completed prior to 
Hurricane Katrina.39 
 
 34. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 11 (testimony of Charlotte H. Nelson). 
 35. Id. at 12. 
 36. Id. at 47–48 (testimony of Edward G. Scogin). 
 37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED PLANNING NEEDED BY THE CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL, TECHNICAL, AND FINANCIAL ISSUES ON THE 
LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT app. I. at 2 (1982) [hereinafter 
1982 GAO REPORT]. 
 38. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16. 
 39. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 6. 
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B. The Levee Failures 
The explanation for why the New Orleans levees failed involves 
a complex interaction of engineering and policy considerations. What 
physically happened to the levees on August 29, 2005, however, is 
largely a technical question. This is not to say that there is an easy 
explanation for what exactly happened to the levees that night, and 
the engineers studying that question will no doubt debate the finer 
points of the analysis for years. The description that follows draws 
primarily upon the preliminary report of a group of experts from the 
University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of 
Civil Engineers (the Berkeley/ASCE group) based upon its analysis 
of the situation shortly after the hurricane.40 The Corps of Engineers, 
a group from the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane 
Center, and a panel assembled by the National Academy of Sciences 
are also conducting in-depth inquiries that could well come to 
different conclusions.41 
1. Lake Pontchartrain and the Outfall Canals.  The water that 
flooded the polder containing downtown New Orleans and the 
French Quarter did not flow over the high level levees situated 
between Lake Pontchartrain and the city. As previously discussed, 
these levees were designed to withstand a hurricane that was roughly 
equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane, and they did 
their job. Most of the experts have agreed that by the time it 
encountered Lake Pontchartrain, Katrina’s status had decreased from 
Category Four to the upper range of Category Three.42 As the surge 
flowed from Lake Pontchartrain up the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, 
and London Avenue outfall canals, it did not overtop the levees 
confining those canals either.43 The surge did, however, cause three 
 
 40. See generally SEED ET AL., supra note 5. 
 41. John M. Barry, After the Deluge, Some Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1. For 
more current information, Boalt Hall School of Law maintains a website of regularly updated 
information on the Katrina disaster, as well as disasters and the law more generally. See 
generally Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, http://128.32.29.133/disasters.php (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2006). 
 42. Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1. 
 43. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5; see also Barry, supra note 41 (citing the preliminary 
conclusions of three post-Katrina engineering studies that the storm surge did not top the 
levees); Celeste Biever, Flood Walls in New Orleans were “Structurally Flawed,” NEW 
SCIENTIST, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8038 (last visited Oct. 5, 
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major breaches in the 17th Street and London Avenue levees.44 These 
breaches allowed water from Lake Pontchartrain to flood wide areas 
of the downtown polder. In the aftermath of the storm, the Corps of 
Engineers stressed that the two specific outfall levees that had 
breached were “fully completed” and not on the list of unfunded 
projects.45 
The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that the levee failure on 
the east side of the 17th Street canal “appears to have been a stability 
failure of the foundation soils beneath the earthen embankment” to 
which the floodwall was attached.46 The group determined as a 
preliminary matter that the breach on the west bank of the London 
Avenue canal “occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being 
pushed backwards by the elevated water pressures on the outboard 
side, and that support on the inboard side of the sheetpile/floodwall 
was reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the 
earthen levee embankment.”47 According to the group’s report 
“[e]vidence at both sites suggests that massive underseepage passed 
beneath the relatively short sheetpiles, and this may have weakened 
the foundation soils beneath the inboard sides of the earthen levee 
embankments.”48 In other words, the pressure that the storm surge 
generated from within the canal caused the weak soil in which the 
floodwalls were anchored to give way in some places and pushed the 
walls backwards into the protected polders. 
Consistent with this conclusion, most experts who have examined 
the question have concluded that at the time the floodwalls were 
designed and built, the floodwalls were not anchored sufficiently 
deeply in the foundation soils.49 The leader of the Berkeley/ASCE 
group noted that the safety margins employed in the designs for the 
levees were far lower than the safety margins employed in most other 
 
2006) (“The way that [the levees] failed was not consistent with overtopping . . . .” (quoting Paul 
Kemp, an oceanologist at the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center)). 
 44. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5. 
 45. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3, at 7. 
 46. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 2-3. 
 47. Id. at 2-6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Biever, supra note 43; see Eli Kintisch, Levees Came Up Short, Researchers Tell 
Congress, 310 SCI. 953, 955 (2005) (showing how the levees, in some areas where they were 
breached, were only half as deep as in other areas and descend no deeper than the layer of 
peat); Joby Warrick & Spencer S. Hsu, Levees’ Construction Faulted in New Orleans Flood 
Inquiry, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2005, at A3 (reviewing testimony of three groups of engineers). 
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critical engineering projects.50 The Corps of Engineers has 
traditionally employed a safety factor of 1.3 for levee construction 
projects, meaning that levees are designed to withstand pressure 
approximately one-third again as powerful as expected forces.51 
According to documents from the mid-1980s when the high level 
option was being implemented along the outfall canals (accounts of 
which vary somewhat), tests of the soil below the existing levees 
encountered a layer of peat some 15–20 feet below the surface.52 The 
design for the project called for sinking the pilings 17–20 feet below 
the surface.53 Because peat expands and softens when it becomes wet, 
the pilings should have been extended sufficiently far beneath the 
peat to provide adequate stability.54 A team of experts from Louisiana 
State University concluded from an examination of historical 
documents that the floodwalls built in the 1980s to implement the 
high level option were not anchored sufficiently deeply because the 
soils immediately below the existing levees consisted of spoil from 
digging the canals in the late nineteenth century and dredging them in 
the early twentieth century.55 This explanation is consistent with 
documents filed in litigation during the mid-1990s between the Corps 
of Engineers and a construction company that had been working on 
the levees. The company claimed that sections of the floodwalls were 
failing to line up properly because of unstable underlying soils.56 
Although Corps of Engineers officials are not yet persuaded by this 
 
 50. Ralph Vartabedian & Stephen Braun, System Failures Seen in Levees, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2005, at A1. 
 51. John McQuaid, Bob Marshall & Mark Schleifstein, Evidence Points to Man-made 
Disaster, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8, 2005, at A1. 
 52. Christopher Drew & John Schwartz, Engineers Point to Flaws in Flood Walls’ Design as 
Probable Cause of Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A17 (peat located 15 feet below the 
surface); Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42 (peat located 20 feet below the surface). 
 53. Drew & Schwartz, supra note 52 (pilings sunk 17 feet below the surface); Warrick & 
Grunwald, supra note 42 (pilings sunk 20 feet below the surface). 
 54. Drew & Schwartz, supra note 52 (citing “[s]everal outside engineers”); see Warrick & 
Grunwald, supra note 42 (noting an Army Corps of Engineers proposal to rebuild the steel 
pilings in the levee system completely through the weak layer of peat). 
 55. Bob Marshall & Mark Schleifstein, Levee Wall Problems too Obvious, Experts Say, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1. 
 56. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42. According to a spokesperson for the Corps of 
Engineers, a number of the documents contained in the 325 boxes of documents that the Corps 
has identified as being related to the construction of New Orleans levees may be withheld from 
the public because of “homeland security concerns.” Mark Schleifstein, Levee Team Runs into 
Wall, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 26, 2005, at 1. 
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explanation, the design for rebuilding the floodwalls post-Katrina 
does call for sinking the pilings to a depth of 40 feet.57 
Other evidence suggests that the contractors who were 
responsible for testing the soil and building the levees along the 
outfall canals may have been responsible for poor construction in 
places where the levees breached.58 A team of engineers from LSU 
who investigated the levee failures at the behest of the state of 
Louisiana discovered that the piling extended only 10 feet below sea 
level in some areas, rather than the 17 foot depth that was called for 
in the design documents.59 Although a Corps of Engineers analysis of 
the same pilings rejected this conclusion,60 the LSU scientists are 
convinced that their assessment is correct because the measuring 
equipment that they used is more accurate than the Corps’ 
equipment.61 The Berkeley/ASCE group also heard allegations of 
malfeasance on the part of contractors in connection with the 
construction of the levees and “some field evidence” appeared to 
“correlate with those stories.”62 Berkeley Engineer Robert Bea 
worried that the outside engineering firms and contractors may have 
been more concerned with the bottom line than with identifying and 
correcting problems in the design and construction of the levees.63 
Louisiana’s attorney general has opened an investigation into these 
allegations.64 
Finally, the Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that lax 
maintenance practices may have contributed to the breach of some of 
the levees lining the outfall canals.65 For example, large trees were 
 
 57. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42. 
 58. See John Schwartz, Panelist on Levees Faults Army Corps Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2005, at A18 (“[S]ome functions once handled by the Corps, like soil boring and testing, 
are now conducted by contractors.”). 
 59. John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana’s Levee Inquiry Faults Army Corps, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28. 
 60. Tests on Key Levee in New Orleans Show Compliance, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2005, at 
A4. 
 61. Mark Schleifstein, LSU Expert Defends Piling Tests, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 15, 2005, 
at 3. 
 62. John Schwartz, Malfeasance Might have Hurt Levees, Engineers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 2005, at A22 (reporting testimony of Raymond B. Seed, leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group); 
Warrick & Hsu, supra note 49 (same). 
 63. Schleifstein, supra note 56. 
 64. Christopher Drew, Inquiry to Seek Cause of Levee Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at 
A21. 
 65. Vartabedian & Braun, supra note 50. 
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allowed to grow at the base of some of the levees. According to 
engineeers, the levee wall’s integrity could have been undermined by 
decomposition and settlement of the soft soil supporting the levees, 
creating “a maze of small cavities that become channels for water to 
migrate from the canals,” which would further weaken the levees.66 In 
addition, state and local officials have admitted that they typically 
skipped the canal floodwalls when they were performing annual levee 
inspections, and that the levees they did inspect were given only 
cursory attention.67 The Corps of Engineers has not yet agreed with 
these assessments, and has instead undertaken an extensive 
investigation of the causes of the outlet canal levee failures.68 
Nevertheless, the information and analysis revealed thus far suggest 
that the outlet canal walls were not overtopped and that the 
downtown polder would not have flooded if the walls had withstood 
the lateral pressure of the storm surge inside the canals, as they were 
designed to do.69 
2. Lake Borgne.  The largest storm surge to hit the New Orleans 
area came not from Lake Pontchartrain to the north but from Lake 
Borgne to the east.70 Although the Corps enhanced the levees for the 
polders protecting New Orleans East from Lake Borgne as part of the 
high level plan, the estimated 18–25 foot storm surge exceeded the 
height of some of the levees protecting that polder by as much as 5–10 
feet.71 These levees were simply not high enough to repel the storm 
surge, and they were “overwhelmed” and “massively eroded.”72 
Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps’ head engineer for the New 
Orleans district, reported that the eastern levees were “literally 
leveled in places.”73 Large areas in this polder, which was inhabited 
 
 66. Bob Marshall, Levee Leaks Reported to S&WB a Year Ago, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 18, 
2005, at 1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Ralph Vartabedian, Levee Report Jibes With Early Speculation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2005, at A31. 
 69. See Ralph Vartabedian, Study Sees Design Issue in Failures of Levees, L.A. TIMES, May 
3, 2006, at A4 (noting that investigators for the Army Corps had issued a report concluding that 
London Avenue levees failed due to erosion of the soil beneath the levee walls, much as earlier 
reports had concluded with respect to the 17th Street breaches). 
 70. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-4. 
 71. Id. at 1-4 to -5. 
 72. Id. at 1-5. 
 73. Ralph Vartabedian, Much Wider Damage to Levees Is Disclosed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2005, at A1. 
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mainly by low-income residents and businesses that served local 
communities, were flooded. Because this surge came from Lake 
Borgne and not Lake Pontchartrain, it is clear that the barrier 
project—had it been constructed during the 1980s—would not have 
prevented this damage and might even have exacerbated it, by 
deflecting some portion of the surge from the two passes to the 
southern half of Lake Borgne. A protection system more massive in 
scope that could have slowed or prevented a storm surge into Lake 
Borgne—such as the huge seagate structures that are utilized to 
protect the Netherlands from North Atlantic storms74—might in 
theory have provided better protection to New Orleans. No such 
structures, however, were contemplated as part of the original barrier 
plan. 
3. The Navigation Canals.  Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge also 
proceeded from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne up the MRGO 
Canal to the Industrial Canal in the heart of New Orleans. The 
MRGO Canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep-draft seaway 
channel that extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of 
New Orleans into Breton Sound and the Gulf of Mexico. It was 
designed to shorten the distance for ships traveling from the eastern 
shipping lanes of the Gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up to 
its economic expectations.75 The storm surge overtopped the levees 
running along these canals at “a number of locations,” and several 
breaches occurred.76 
A post-Katrina modeling exercise undertaken by the LSU 
Hurricane Center concluded that the “funneling” effect of the 
MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet wide where it intersects 
the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet wide where it bisects the 
Industrial Canal, intensified the initial storm surge by about 20 
 
 74. Molly Moore, Rethinking Defenses Against Sea’s Power, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at 
A22. 
 75. See Michael Grunwald, Canal May Have Worsened City’s Flooding, WASH. POST, Sept. 
14, 2005, at A21 (stating that less than 3 percent, or less than one ship per day, of the Port of 
New Orleans’ cargo traffic uses the MRGO and that critics have calculated MRGO’s cost to 
taxpayers at more than twelve thousand dollars per vessel per day). But see Lake Pontchartrain 
Basin Foundation, Martello Castle Background Information, http://wetmaap.org/Martello_ 
Castle/Supplement/mc_background.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (suggesting that the 
MRGO has generated over one billion dollars a year in revenue for the city of New Orleans 
even though the United States Army Corps of Engineers spends about seven to eight million 
dollars a year to maintain the MRGO). 
 76. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5. 
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM 
2006] DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS? 197 
percent and increased the velocity of the surge from three to 6–8 feet 
per second.77 G. Paul Kemp, an oceanographer at the LSU Hurricane 
Center, concluded that the MRGO funnel was “a back door into New 
Orleans,” and he had little doubt that it “was the initial cause of the 
disaster.”78 As a result of these levee failures, large areas of flooding 
occurred to the south and north of the MRGO canal, within the 
polders containing St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward, and New 
Orleans East.79 As with the storm surge from Lake Borgne, the 
barrier project would not have protected the two flooded polders 
from the surge that overtopped and breached the levees along the 
MRGO Canal, because no protection systems were contemplated to 
prevent the funneling effect of the canal. 
The levees lining the Industrial Canal experienced a number of 
much smaller failures along both of the canal’s banks. Several 
breaches occurred along the eastern bank between the MRGO Canal 
to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north.80 These breaches 
allowed water to flow to the east into the New Orleans East polder. 
The levees along the western edge of the Industrial Canal were 
breached in three places located almost directly across from the point 
at which the MRGO Canal adjoins the Industrial Canal.81 The 
Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that “storm surges overtopped 
numerous stretches of levees along this Canal frontage.”82 The LSU 
Hurricane Center’s post-Katrina modeling exercise concluded that 
the enhanced velocity of the storm surge as it traveled up the MRGO 
Canal also contributed to the scouring that undermined the levees 
along the Industrial Canal.83 These after-the-fact analyses are 
consistent with the contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster 
on the Industrial Canal, who reported to the Corps of Engineers that 
the surge reached that canal before dawn and overflowed on both 
sides.84 The lockmaster’s observations also cast doubt on the claim 
that the surge from Lake Pontchartrain caused the levee failures on 
 
 77. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42. 
 78. Id. 
 79. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5. 
 80. Id. at 1-10 fig.1.4. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2-9. 
 83. Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 42. 
 84. John McQuaid, Katrina Trapped City in Double Disasters, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
BREAKING NEWS WEBLOG, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/ 
mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09_07.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
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the Industrial Canal because, according to the Corps of Engineers 
New Orleans Project Manager, the Lake Pontchartrain surge 
occurred much later in the morning, after the hurricane’s eye had 
passed east of the city and winds from the north began to force water 
to the south toward the city.85 
It is theoretically possible that the overtopping and resultant 
erosion of the Industrial Canal levees would have occurred even in 
the absence of the MRGO Canal because of the subsequent storm 
surge from Lake Pontchartrain. However, the conclusion that the 
storm surge from the MRGO Canal caused the levees along the 
Industrial Canal to fail is amply supported by hindsight observations 
of the Industrial Canal levees, hindsight re-creation of the storm 
surge using sophisticated mathematical models, and 
contemporaneous observations by at least one eyewitness.  
II.  THE BLAME GAME 
The preceding description of the complex system of levees that 
was supposed to protect New Orleans at the time of Hurricane 
Katrina suggests that the question posed in the introduction to this 
article—“Why did the levees fail?—is framed too broadly or, perhaps, 
too simplistically. In fact, many levees failed in many places for many 
different reasons. Some were overtopped by floodwaters that then 
scoured out the levee support from inside the protected area. Others 
could not withstand the direct pressure of the storm surge from 
outside the protected area because they were not embedded 
sufficiently deeply in the underlying soils. Some floodwalls may have 
come apart during the storm surge because connections between 
individual wall sections failed. Future investigations will no doubt 
uncover still other suggested reasons for the various levee failures 
that occurred during the Katrina storm surge. 
Because the levee systems divided the city and surrounding areas 
into polders, the failure of the levee system protecting one polder did 
not necessarily contribute to the damage caused by the failure of the 
levee system protecting a different polder. Some areas of the city 
would not have flooded had one levee system held, even if the others 
had failed. Other areas of the city would not have flooded had two 
levee systems both held, but would have flooded if either of the two 
failed. All of these inquiries are essentially engineering questions and 
 
 85. Id. 
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are best answered through detailed field investigations and complex 
mathematical modeling exercises. Still, although correct answers to 
these questions are relevant to the post-Katrina blame game, they will 
not by themselves be sufficient to resolve the broader issues raised by 
Katrina, including the prominent contention that NEPA played a 
causal role in the New Orleans flooding.86 
Not long after the damage to New Orleans became apparent, a 
retired Corps of Engineers official, conservative pundits, and 
politicians began a campaign to blame the damage on a lawsuit 
brought against the Corps of Engineers in 1976 by local fishermen 
and a local environmental group called Save Our Wetlands.87 Citing 
that litigation and other clearly irrelevant litigation involving the 
Mississippi River levee system far upstream of New Orleans, 
conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. claimed that “[f]or 
too long, environmentalist fanatics with no sense of a broad-based 
commonweal have had a veto over government and private-sector 
projects essential to the health and well-being of millions of 
Americans.”88 A columnist for FrontPage online magazine referred to 
the Save our Wetlands litigation as “green genocide.”89 The chairman 
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee asked the 
Justice Department to investigate whether any environmental 
litigation might have played a role in the New Orleans flooding, and 
high level officials in that Department circulated an email to line 
 
 86. See, e.g., Alan Levin & Peter Eisler, Many Decisions Led to Failed Levees, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, at 3A (arguing that metal gates were never built because local officials 
believed the gates would have interfered with the city’s network of pump stations); Tyrell, Jr., 
supra note 8; John Berlau, Greens vs. Levees, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www. 
nationalreview.com/comment/berlau200509080824.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (stating that 
Environmental Protection Agency reviews can delay projects by years); Bruce McQuain, You 
Can Pay Me Now or You Can Pay Me Later, THE QANDO BLOG, Sept. 17, 2005, http://www. 
qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=2595 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (arguing that the failure to satisfy 
federal environmental laws stopped the barrier project). 
 87. See Adriel Bettelheim, Corps Controversy Builds on Gulf Coast, CONG. Q. WKLY., 
Sept. 12, 2005, at 2381, 2382 (reporting comments of former Representative Robert L. 
Livingston); Oliver A. Houck, The U.S. House of Representatives’ Task Force on NEPA: The 
Professors Speak, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,895, 10,897 (2005) (describing post-Katrina efforts 
“claiming that it was the environmentalists who drowned New Orleans”); Ralph Vartabedian & 
Peter Pae, A Barrier that Could Have Been, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1 (discussing opinion 
of former Corps of Engineers chief counsel Joseph Towers). 
 88. Tyrell, Jr., supra note 8. 
 89. Michael Tremoglie, New Orleans: A Green Genocide, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, 
Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/printable.asp?ID=19418 (last visited Aug. 
15, 2006). 
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attorneys asking for information about cases in which they had 
defended the Corps of Engineers from environmental claims 
involving the levees protecting New Orleans.90 The House Task Force 
on Improving the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA Task 
Force”)—already controversial due to its perceived heavy-
handedness and overtly politicized agenda91—decided to add the Save 
Our Wetlands litigation to its agenda as it considered possible 
amendments to NEPA.92 
The plaintiffs filed Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush93 in 1976, 
some time after work had begun on the levees between New Orleans 
and the passes at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur, but before work 
had been initiated on the barrier structures. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the FEIS that the Corps of Engineers had prepared for the 
barrier project did not meet the requirements of Section 102 of 
NEPA in several regards. In particular, they claimed that the FEIS 
had not adequately addressed the potential adverse impact of the 
structures on the normal tidal flows of water between Lake Borgne 
and Lake Pontchartrain. In their view, the flows were critical to 
maintaining the vitality of the Lake Pontchartrain fishery and the 
overall integrity of the marine ecosystem. 
The district court held that the FEIS was in fact inadequate. It 
concluded that “the picture of the project painted in the FEIS was not 
in fact a tested conclusion but a hope by the persons planning the 
project that it could in fact be constructed so as to meet the 
environmental objectives set out in the FEIS.”94 The court noted that 
the chief engineer for the Corps’ New Orleans Division had requested 
further model studies because the studies upon which the draft EIS 
relied were undertaken more than a decade earlier, and had 
addressed an obsolete version of the project. The chief engineer 
 
 90. Dan Eggen, Senate Panel Investigating Challenges to Levees, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 
2005, at A10; Mitchell, supra note 19. 
 91. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,896–98 (describing controversy surrounding the NEPA 
Task Force). 
 92. Ralph Vartabedian & Richard B. Schmitt, Mid-60s Project Fuels Environmental Fight, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A22; Press Release, Task Force on Improving the Nat’l Envtl. 
Policy Act, U.S. Reps to Review Environmental Reg’s Role in Affordable Energy, Post-Katrina 
Development (Sept. 8, 2005), http://resoucrescommittee.house.gov/neptaskforce/press/ 
0809virginia.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). 
 93. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, No. 75-3710, slip op. (E.D. La. 1977), http://www. 
saveourwetlands.org/77-schwartz.htm. 
 94. Id. 
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feared that the flow of water between the lakes would be far less in 
the new version of the project than in the earlier version. The Corps’ 
environmental staff initiated the requested model studies, but had not 
completed them when the FEIS came out. Even though more 
appropriate studies were on the way, the FEIS continued to rely upon 
the obsolete studies, and this unexplained impatience on the part of 
the Corps clearly troubled the court.95 
The court was also troubled by the content of the analysis that 
the FEIS did provide and the role of upper level officials in 
determining that content. The biological analysis presented in the 
FEIS relied entirely on a single telephone conversation with a marine 
biologist who was asked to speculate about the impact of the project 
on marine organisms using the interlake flow rates predicted by the 
obsolete model. The Corps of Engineers official responsible for 
preparing the EIS expressed reservations about key statements made 
about the effects of the structures on marine life in the lake, and he 
suggested that the document’s conclusion that the project “would 
not” have a significant impact on lake biology should at least be 
changed to “should not.” That official, however, was overruled by his 
superiors. In addition, the assessment of the barrier project’s benefits 
included the benefits of further urban development on wetlands that 
would be reclaimed from the lake after the project was completed, 
but it failed to take into consideration the fact that the area had also 
been designated as a protected wetland. A Corps economist had 
pointed this out and asked that the analysis be modified accordingly. 
He, too, was overruled by upper level officials.96 
The court concluded that in light of “the problems of which the 
Corps was aware with respect to the possibility of significantly 
decreased tidal flow through the structures,” the analysis of 
alternatives in the FEIS was inadequate. The court concluded that the 
FEIS “precludes both the public and the governmental parties from 
the opportunity to fairly and adequately analyze the benefits and 
detriments of the proposed plan and any alternatives to it.”97 It 
therefore enjoined further work on the barrier structures until the 
Corps had completed an adequate FEIS. The court made clear, 
however, that its opinion and order should “in no way be construed as 
precluding the Lake Pontchartrain project as proposed or reflecting 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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on its advisability in any manner,” and it stressed that “[u]pon proper 
compliance with the law with regard to the impact statement, this 
injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly 
presented will be allowed to proceed.”98 
III.  HINDSIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOODING 
The starting point in a hindsight causation analysis is careful 
historical reconstruction of the event in question. The analyst must 
then compare that reconstruction to a hypothetical scenario in which 
the act or omission alleged to be the cause of the consequence at issue 
did not occur. If, in this alternative state of the world, the harmful 
event still occurs, then the suspected act or omission is not a but-for 
cause of the event.99 Proper hindsight analysis therefore requires both 
an accurate reconstruction of the actual history of the event and a 
persuasive analysis of the appropriate counterfactual scenario. Of 
course, such but-for causation analysis by itself is insufficient for 
purposes of assigning legal or moral responsibility, given the variety 
of other considerations that ultimately must be brought to bear on the 
situation in order to move from but-for to blameworthiness analysis.100 
Nevertheless, the but-for method of identifying contributing causes 
does provide a conventional starting point for the ultimate attribution 
of responsibility. For the post-Katrina debate over NEPA, therefore, 
the first important question to ask is whether, but for Save Our 
Wetlands, the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans would still have 
occurred. This Part answers that question. 
A. The Lake Borgne and MRGO Levee Failures 
From the engineering analysis related above,101 it seems clear 
beyond cavil that the waters that flooded the New Orleans East 
polder, which lies north of the MRGO Canal and west of the 
intersection of the MRGO Canal and the Intercoastal Waterway, 
came directly from Lake Borgne and indirectly from the Gulf of 
Mexico via the MRGO Canal. The flooding of the polder to the south 
of the MRGO Canal and to the east of the Industrial Canal resulted 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 110–14 (2d ed. 1985); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984). 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 75–85. 
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when waters flowing up the MRGO Canal overtopped the levees 
along that canal and brought waters into the interior of the polder. 
This flooding took place before the eye of Hurricane Katrina passed 
to the east of the city and began to drive waters from Lake 
Pontchartrain up the Industrial Canal and the outfall canals in the 
downtown polder. It clearly did not result from waters entering Lake 
Pontchartrain from Lake Borgne at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur 
passes. Had the barrier project been constructed, the flooding of this 
area would still have occurred due to waters entering the polder 
directly from Lake Borgne and traveling up the MRGO Canal from 
Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico. It is even possible that the 
flooding of the New Orleans East area would have been worse if the 
barrier plan had been implemented, given the likelihood that more of 
the surge would have been directed along these channels. Thus, 
hindsight causation analysis strongly suggests that the lawsuit was not 
to blame for any of this flooding, and few uncertainties cloud this 
analysis. 
B. The Industrial Canal Levee Failures 
Hindsight analysis offers a somewhat less certain answer to the 
question of whether the overtopping of the levees on the west bank of 
the Industrial Canal would have occurred had the Corps of Engineers 
not abandoned the barrier project. That project was designed to 
reduce the chance that a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain would 
breach the levees along the lake and along the canals that open to 
that lake. It also provided for a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated 
flood control structure where the Industrial Canal enters Lake 
Pontchartrain. Had the barrier project been completed and had it 
functioned properly (a topic addressed in the next Section102), it would 
have added to the protection of areas placed at risk from overtopping 
of the Industrial Canal levees, to the extent that the risk was 
attributable to waters from Lake Pontchartrain. 
The engineers have agreed that the levees on the Industrial 
Canal were overtopped and that the breaches probably occurred 
because waters that flowed over the levees scoured out the soils 
behind those levees.103 Engineering analysis of the levees after the 
flood, hindsight modeling, and the contemporaneous observations of 
 
 102. See infra Part III.C. 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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the lockmaster all converge on the conclusion that the waters that 
overtopped the levees in the Industrial Canal came from Lake 
Borgne and points east, rather than from Lake Pontchartrain. The 
fact that the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overtop the 
levees bordering the outlet canals during Hurricane Katrina further 
supports the conclusion that the levees bordering the Industrial 
Canal, which parallels those canals, would not have been overtopped 
in the absence of the larger storm surge that flowed up the MRGO 
Canal. The fact that the storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal 
did overtop the levees bordering that canal suggests that the MRGO 
surge had the capacity to overtop the levees on the Industrial Canal 
as the surge proceeded westward. Finally, the fact that the damaged 
portions of the levees along the west side of the Industrial Canal were 
directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal enters the 
Industrial Canal at a right angle is also consistent with the conclusion 
that the waters that overtopped the Industrial Canal levees came 
from Lake Borgne and the east, and not from Lake Pontchartrain. 
As the prior discussion reveals, the barrier project would not 
have prevented the storm surge that moved westward along the 
MRGO Canal. Indeed, had the gated flood control structure at the 
entrance of the Industrial Canal to Lake Pontchartrain been closed as 
envisioned in the barrier project, it could have exacerbated the effects 
of the storm surge moving along the MRGO Canal when it arrived at 
the Industrial Canal by preventing water from exiting the Industrial 
Canal into Lake Pontchartrain. It appears, therefore, that the failure 
to build the barrier project did not cause the flooding that resulted 
from the failure of the levees along the Industrial Canal. That 
conclusion cannot be stated as confidently as the prior conclusion 
about the flooding that resulted from the failures of the levees along 
the MRGO Canal, because the Industrial Canal was directly 
connected to Lake Pontchartrain and the barrier project (had it 
functioned properly) would have offered protection against waters 
from that lake. Moreover, it is still possible—though not likely—that 
all of the preliminary analyses are wrong and that the 
contemporaneous observations were mistaken. 
C. The 17th Street and London Avenue Levee Failures 
There is no dispute that the storm surge that caused the 17th 
Street and London Avenue levee failures originated in Lake 
Pontchartrain. To the extent that the force of the Lake Pontchartrain 
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM 
2006] DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS? 205 
storm surge would have been reduced by the barrier project, some or 
all of the downtown polder may not have flooded had it been 
completed prior to Katrina. This is not a minor matter, because the 
greatest economic damage occurred in the downtown polder, and it 
appears that the largest number of deaths also occurred in that 
polder.104 Even if Save Our Wetlands did not cause all of the flooding 
in the New Orleans area, the claim that it caused the flooding of the 
downtown polder alone is an extremely serious one that bears careful 
analysis. 
Several large uncertainties, however, complicate but-for causal 
analysis of the connection between Save Our Wetlands and the 
flooding of the downtown polder. First, the storm surge from Lake 
Pontchartrain did not overtop the levees protecting the city from the 
lake itself, nor were the levees breached. Moreover, all of the 
engineering reports that have come to light thus far have concluded 
that the surge flowing from Lake Pontchartrain up the outfall canals 
did not overtop the levees lining those canals. Like the levees along 
the lake, those levees were designed to be of sufficient height to resist 
overtopping from the SPH, and Katrina apparently did not generate a 
storm surge exceeding that height. Most engineers have concluded 
that the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue outfall 
canals failed because the storm surge forced parts of the floodwalls 
away from the canals and into the surrounding neighborhoods. The 
Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overwhelm those levees; it 
simply defeated them at critical weak points. Although the 
engineering analysis is still clouded with considerable uncertainty, it 
appears that those levees were either designed or constructed in a 
fashion that prevented them from doing what they were supposed to 
do.105 
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily lead directly to 
the ultimate conclusion that the failure to construct the barrier 
project was not a but-for cause of the flooding of the downtown 
polder. Even if it is true that a cause of the failure of the outfall canal 
levees was improper design or improper construction, it is equally 
 
 104. John Simerman, Dwight Ou & Ted Mellnik, Canal Breaches Led to Most New Orleans 
Deaths, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 30, 2005, at A1. 
 105. See John M. Barry, Op-Ed., After the Deluge, Some Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2005, at A27 (citing three preliminary post-Katrina engineering studies for the proposition that 
“if the levees had performed as they were supposed to, the deaths in New Orleans proper, the 
scenes in the Superdome and the city’s destruction would never have taken place”). 
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clear that neither of those factors caused the levees to fail in the 
absence of the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain. More to the 
point, it is certainly possible that the storm surge in Lake 
Pontchartrain would have been much less powerful had barrier gates 
at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes been in place and closed 
before Katrina hit. The resulting storm surge may then have lacked 
sufficient force to breach the outfall canal levees even at their 
weakest points. Viewed somewhat differently, the barrier project may 
have provided a critical margin of safety for the overall system that 
would have prevented the flooding of the downtown polder, allowing 
for the possibility that the outfall canals would have been negligently 
constructed or maintained. 
A proper hindsight analysis to test this hypothesis would have to 
estimate the force of the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain under the 
assumption that the seagates at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes 
had been properly designed and constructed and had been properly 
closed prior to the time that the surge from Hurricane Katrina moved 
from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain. 
The outcome of this analysis is by no means certain. For example, a 
spokesperson for the New Orleans division of the Corps 
acknowledged after Hurricane Katrina that he was not sure “how 
much [the barrier project] would have prevented anything.”106 Other 
reports suggest that 
Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the 
original proposed design had been built because the storm surge 
would likely have gone over the top of the barrier and floodgates, 
flooded Lake Pontchartrain, and gone over the original lower levees 
planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan.107 
It is necessary to go beyond these statements, however, given 
that Army Corps representatives have obvious reasons for 
discounting the likelihood that the barrier plan would have 
performed better than the high level plan. A proper analysis of how 
the barrier plan would have fared during Katrina would require a 
complex modeling exercise that would in turn require the analyst to 
 
 106. Mitchell, supra note 19. 
 107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS LAKE 
PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE 
THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND WATER DEV. OF THE H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 6 
(2005) (emphasis added) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS]. 
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determine the height of the storm surge at the passes and compare it 
to the design height of the levees and seagates. As noted previously, 
the project was designed to withstand the SPH, which in New Orleans 
was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane.108 
Although the media initially reported expert conclusions that Katrina 
was a Category Four Hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale when the 
eye passed to the east of New Orleans,109 subsequent analyses of the 
water levels along the levees have suggested that the storm may have 
weakened to Category Three status by the time the storm surge from 
Lake Pontchartrain hit the city.110 The Saffir-Simpson scale, in any 
event, is based on wind speed and not predicted storm surge levels, 
and in some circumstances it may be possible for a Category Two 
storm to produce a storm surge that exceeds that of a Category Three 
storm.111 Hence, even estimating the height of the storm surge at the 
Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes is fraught with uncertainty. 
If the storm surge would have exceeded the height of the levees 
and seagates between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, then the 
surge would have entered the lake at an attenuated level and 
probably at a lower velocity. This alone, however, would not have 
prevented a surge in Lake Pontchartrain because the strong 
northeasterly winds produced by the hurricane still would have 
caused water that was already in the lake to surge against the levees 
protecting New Orleans. Some of that water would have surged up 
the ungated outfall canals and that surge would have tested the 
levees. Whether the seagates would have reduced the surge from 
Lake Pontchartrain sufficiently to prevent the breach of poorly 
designed or constructed levees is therefore an exceedingly complex 
question, the answer to which would require expertise in 
meteorology, hydrology, engineering, mathematical modeling, and 
probably other disciplines. Certainly one cannot conclude without a 
great deal of additional analysis that the barrier project as conceived 
in the early 1970s—even if perfectly implemented and executed—
 
 108. John McQuaid, New Orleans Levee System Left Poor Neighborhoods Vulnerable, 
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2005, available at http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/ 
mcquaid092105.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006); McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18; 
Mitchell, supra note 19. 
 109. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3. 
 110. See supra note 19. 
 111. McQuaid, supra note 108. 
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would have prevented the downtown polder from flooding during 
Hurricane Katrina. 
Moreover, even if the analysts could confidently reach that 
conclusion, a proper hindsight analysis would also need to take into 
account an alternative scenario in which the barrier project was not 
properly implemented. If it is true, for example, that the high level 
project was poorly implemented, there may be good reason to 
question whether the barrier project would have been implemented 
as designed. A proper hindsight analysis would therefore factor in the 
possibility that the levees running from the city to the Rigolets and 
Chef Menteur passes or the seagates at the passes would have been 
breached, just as the levees along the outfall canals were breached. It 
might also examine the scenario in which the seagates were not 
properly closed in anticipation of the hurricane; given the numerous 
instances of official breakdown that occurred as Katrina and its 
aftermath actually unfolded, such a possibility is not at all farfetched. 
In either case, the storm surge flowing into Lake Pontchartrain from 
the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne would have been much larger, 
and the surge that moved up the outfall canals might not have 
differed greatly from the surge that did in fact move up those canals 
during Hurricane Katrina. 
The hindsight analysis would next have to examine the effect of 
Save Our Wetlands on the Corps of Engineers’ decision not to build 
the barrier project. Some legal analysts, including the United States 
Government Accountability Office, have concluded that the Save 
Our Wetlands injunction should have delayed the barrier option only 
until the Corps remedied the problems that the court had identified in 
the EIS.112 There is little reason to believe that the court would not 
have lifted the injunction as soon as the Corps of Engineers updated 
the EIS with adequate hydrological modeling (as requested by its own 
chief engineer), conducted a more thorough biological assessment, 
and considered a few reasonable alternatives. This may have delayed 
the completion of the project during the time that it took for the 
Corps to finish this task and defend its product in court. Although 
further hypothetical analysis would be required to determine whether 
this would have delayed completion of the barriers past August 2005, 
there is little reason to believe that completion would not have 
 
 112. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,897 (“Usually the Corps rewrote its statements and 
proceeded, although often with environmental modifications and mitigation.”). 
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proceeded at least as quickly as the high level project, which did not 
get started until 1985 but which was substantially completed by the 
time that Hurricane Katrina hit. 
Of course, the Corps of Engineers did not respond to the 
injunction by preparing an adequate EIS for the barrier plan. Instead, 
it reexamined the mounting cost of the barrier project in light of the 
cost of the alternative high level project and decided to implement 
the latter project. Thus, one could argue that the litigation caused the 
Corps to rethink the alternatives in a manner that might not have 
occurred absent the litigation-induced pause to rethink.113 If the Corps 
would have forged ahead with the original barrier project despite its 
increasing cost and despite strong local opposition, then the lawsuit 
was indeed a but-for cause of the failure to implement the barrier 
project—albeit only in an attenuated, happenstance way. The 
likelihood of even that scenario, moreover, must be discounted by the 
probability that the Corps would have changed course at some point 
anyway prior to completing the project, given the variety of other 
considerations that began to weigh against the barrier plan. 
D. From But-For to Blameworthiness 
In a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event 
will be traceable to innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s 
occurrence.114 With respect to the levee failures in New Orleans, for 
instance, potential causal contributors include not only Save Our 
Wetlands, which is said to have led the Corps to adopt an inferior 
levee plan, but also the local residents and officials who long opposed 
more robust protection plans out of cost concerns.115 Additional 
contributors could include the Corps officials who, after a lengthy and 
unexplained delay, ultimately made the decision to switch from the 
barrier to the high level plan; the contractors who allegedly 
implemented the high level plan with inadequate care; the land use 
planning officials whose decisions to permit massive conversion of 
wetlands for development rendered New Orleans much more 
 
 113. See David Schoenbrod, The Lawsuit That Sank New Orleans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 
2005, at A18 (arguing that the Corps of Engineers cannot be expected to resume a project 
where it left off when that project has been halted by litigation). 
 114. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Causation and Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S144, S145 (2005) (explaining the concept of multicausality). 
 115. 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. I at 9 (noting that local interests requested 
study of a 100-year design hurricane rather than the more severe standard project hurricane). 
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vulnerable to storm surges regardless of which plan was adopted; the 
government officials who were responsible for the Mississippi River 
flood protection system, which also perversely made New Orleans 
much more vulnerable to Gulf Coast storms. Perhaps the list would 
even include the incalculable number of causal contributors to 
human-induced climate change, which might in theory have played a 
role in exacerbating Katrina’s intensity.116 
Apportioning responsibility and fault among these many but-for 
causes requires much more than simply empirical analysis and 
reconstruction. It requires an assignation of blameworthiness 
according to moral, political, and legal criteria. For seemingly 
opportunistic reasons, a number of officials and analysts have 
attempted to single out Save Our Wetlands for particularly severe 
blameworthiness in the aftermath of Katrina. If the preliminary 
engineering reports turn out to be correct, however, then the most 
damaging flooding in the New Orleans area is attributable most 
obviously and directly to the MRGO and to inadequate construction 
and maintenance of the 17th Street and London Avenue levees, not 
to the design of the LPVHPP.117 Analysts who wish to pin 
responsibility for the Katrina disaster on NEPA must therefore offer 
an account not only of how Save Our Wetlands led to the adoption of 
the high level plan, but also how the litigation led to malfeasance in 
the implementation of that plan. No serious effort has been made to 
offer such an account, nor is it obvious how one could be constructed 
with any degree of plausibility. 
In the end, the only clear but-for consequence of Save Our 
Wetlands was a court-imposed moment of taking stock, a moment in 
which the Army Corps was asked to reevaluate a long-troubled 
project in light of better information, changed circumstances, and 
competing values—precisely the point of the NEPA procedure. The 
Corps ultimately retained discretion to proceed with the barrier plan 
after conducting a proper environmental impact assessment, and it 
certainly need not have waited nearly seven years before deciding to 
 
 116. See Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 
Years, 436 NATURE 686, 686 (2005) (arguing that hurricane intensity will increase as mean 
global temperatures rise). 
 117. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,897 n.28 (“Bottom line: the levee plan was fine, but its 
faulty construction flooded the city.”). 
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abandon the barrier plan as it did.118 In short, one simply cannot 
account for the Corps’ behavior by focusing on NEPA and Save Our 
Wetlands alone. Instead, to appreciate why the Corps planning and 
implementation process for the LPVHPP took the shape that it did, 
one must broaden the critical focus to include the Congress, Army 
Corps leaders and staff, local residents and officials, scientific and 
engineering experts, government contractors, local and national 
political interests, and a variety of other key decisionmakers and 
influences. As the next Part describes, these numerous forces 
combined in New Orleans to create a policymaking process that, at 
least in hindsight, seems to have been especially handicapped in its 
ability to grapple with long-term catastrophic potentialities—the very 
point of natural disaster policy. 
IV.  LESSONS FOR ANALYSTS FROM THE KATRINA LEVEE DEBATE 
One obvious message of the forgoing discussion is that 
retrospective analysis of cause and effect can be an exceedingly 
complex and uncertainty-laden exercise. The fact that all of the 
relevant facts are in the past and can, at least in theory, be accurately 
ascertained does not mean that retrospective analysis can avoid the 
speculation that is inherent in prospective analysis: the counterfactual 
nature of the causation exercise demands a similar task of projecting 
unknown states of the world in order to determine what would have 
eventuated in the absence of the targeted causal factor. Hindsight 
analysis of the Katrina disaster suggests that in a changing world, the 
farther removed the analysis is in time from the event under 
inspection, the more difficult it will be to draw confident conclusions 
about cause and effect. Failing memories and lost documentation can, 
of course, hinder attempts to reconstruct past histories. In addition, 
intervening events can greatly complicate the construction and 
analysis of counterfactual scenarios. The more relevant intervening 
events that are possible, the more the counterfactual narrative will 
become clouded by uncertainties. 
In short, as one moves farther away from the available data—
whether simply in terms of time, or of the number of additional 
 
 118. Complying with NEPA following the 1977 injunction is not the only time that the 
Corps seems to have dragged its feet on New Orleans hurricane protection matters: in 1999, 
Congress appropriated money for a $12 million study to determine how much it would cost to 
protect New Orleans from a Category Five hurricane, but the study had not even been launched 
as of September 2005. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3. 
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variables or intervening events—the risk increases that one’s 
conclusions will be based on undefended modeling assumptions 
rather than on actual empirical evidence.119 The NEPA Task Force, 
many of whose members have expressed a strong desire to reduce 
NEPA’s procedural requirements, seems to have fallen prey to just 
such an undefended assumption in its haste to attribute the Katrina 
levee failures to NEPA litigation. Hindsight analysis of the Katrina 
disaster offers no support at all for legislative action aimed at 
repealing or amending NEPA to reduce the incidence of judicial 
intervention into executive branch activities under that statute. As 
previously discussed, the causal analysis that leads from a 1977 
injunction pending the preparation of an adequate EIS to the 
flooding of the downtown polder in 2005 is so laden with uncertainty, 
and so dependant on unsupported speculation, that it simply cannot 
provide a rational justification for an action as momentous as 
overhauling one of modern federal environmental law’s keystone 
statutes. 
Nevertheless, as this Part describes, the history of the LPVHPP 
planning process does offer some reliable lessons regarding the 
challenge of natural disaster policymaking—lessons that should guide 
analysts as they consider post-Katrina hurricane protection for New 
Orleans and other projects that guard against long-term, low-
probability, high-consequence events. The rather pessimistic 
conclusion we have reached regarding our powers of accurate, 
comprehensive hindsight analysis is likewise applicable to our 
predictive analysis of future consequences of government 
interventions. The systems that drive the incidence and severity of 
disaster consequences—whether in the form of natural systems that 
give rise to extreme weather and geological events, or of 
socioeconomic systems that determine in part how deadly and costly 
the consequences of such events will be—are characterized by 
enormous complexity and uncertainty. What often will be required in 
disaster planning, therefore, is collective judgment regarding the 
degree of moral and political commitment that citizens desire to 
express, both to their fellow citizens within the present generation 
and to the generations to come, through public prevention and 
mitigation projects that may have highly uncertain long-term payoffs. 
 
 119. Gary King & Langche Zeng, When Can History be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of 
Counterfactual Inference, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/counterf.pdf. 
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As this Part describes, through familiar tools of risk assessment and 
policy analysis, the LPVHPP planning process seems to have 
inadvertently obscured the need for precisely that brand of judgment. 
A.  The Standard Project Hurricane 
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many 
commentators assumed that New Orleans had finally outrun its luck. 
As noted previously, initial reports suggested that Katrina made 
landfall as a storm with a severity and a path that numerous experts 
repeatedly had warned would someday strike the city with 
catastrophic results, a storm that simply overwhelmed the design 
standard of the LPVHPP and other New Orleans area levee 
systems.120 At least at this stage, however, engineering reports point 
instead to a failure of implementation, such that it is quite possible 
that Katrina would not have overwhelmed the New Orleans levees 
had they been constructed and maintained properly. Still, this more 
mundane and lamentable explanation of the Katrina levee failure 
does not obviate the need to look closely at the levee design process 
for evidence of significant failures in our thinking about long-term 
catastrophic risks. Unfortunately, the many pre-Katrina warnings that 
seemed so prophetic in the storm’s immediate aftermath remain 
urgently relevant today, both to the post-Katrina reconstruction 
process and to the challenge of natural disaster policy more generally. 
At the heart of the LPVHPP and most other Army Corps 
hurricane protection projects since the 1960s has been a technical 
model known as the standard project hurricane (SPH).121 Because 
development of this model preceded the Saffir-Simpson hurricane 
scale, attempts to describe the design standard of the LPVHPP in the 
wake of Katrina have been somewhat confused. Depending on 
whether one is referring to barometric pressure, radius, wind speed, 
or other critical storm characteristics, the SPH can vary from a 
Category Two to Four storm on the now more familiar Saffir-
Simpson scale,122 although most commentators have been describing 
the SPH as “roughly equivalent” to a fast-moving Category Three 
storm.123 Nor does the SPH translate smoothly into the conventional 
 
 120. See supra note 3. 
 121. See Harry S. Perdikis, Hurricane Flood Protection in the United States, 93 J. OF THE 
WATERWAYS & HARBORS DIVISION, Feb. 1967, at 3–8. 
 122. GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 123. E.g., GAO REPORT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 107, at 4. 
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return period approach of describing storms in relation to their 
expected interval of occurrence. Again, analysts have been describing 
the SPH as comparable to the worst storm that could be expected 
every 200 to 300 years,124 although in actuality the SPH bears no direct 
relationship to such return-period or frequency intervals. As the 
National Weather Service stated in a 1972 technical memorandum, 
“the standard project hurricane has no frequency assigned to it.”125 
The SPH was developed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1950s 
at the request of Congress “to provide generalized hurricane 
specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically 
for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design 
criteria for hurricane protection works.”126 In conjunction with the 
U.S. Weather Bureau, the Corps compiled data on all tropical storms 
of hurricane intensity within specific geographic zones over the 
period from 1900 to 1956.127 Using this data, the agencies created an 
index representing “the most severe combination of hurricane 
parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified 
geographical region, excluding extremely rare combinations.”128 
Specifically, central barometric pressure was used as the main 
estimation characteristic to generate a hypothetical or model storm 
for project planning with respect to any given geographic area. 
Although the original SPH model used a 100-year return period to 
identify the key central pressure measure for a given area,129 the 
resulting model hurricane did not, strictly speaking, represent a 100-
year storm. Instead, the 100-year pressure low was interpolated with 
other storm characteristics such as storm radius, wind speed, forward 
speed, and storm direction to generate “the most severe 
conditions . . . that are within the parameters of the SPH indices . . . 
 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 125. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
MEMORANDUM HUR 7–120, PRELIMINARY REVISED STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE 
CRITERIA FOR THE ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1972). 
 126. HOWARD E. GRAHAM & DWIGHT E. NUNN, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L 
HURRICANE RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT NO. 33, METEOROLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
PERTINENT TO STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE, ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (1959). For a nontechnical overview of the standard project hurricane and 
related engineering issues, see J.J. Westerink & R.A. Leuttich, The Creeping Storm, CIV. 
ENGINEERING MAG., June 2003, at 46, 48–52. 
 127. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3, 72–73. 
 128. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9. 
 129. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3. 
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for [a particular] location,”130 a procedure that resulted in SPH storms 
of varying frequency depending on location-specific criteria. 
Initially, an overriding goal of the SPH appears to have been 
simply a desire to compare hurricane protection standards from 
region to region: “The standard project hurricane wind field and 
parameters represent a ‘standard’ against which the degree of 
protection finally selected for a hurricane protection project may be 
judged and compared with protection provided at projects in other 
localities.”131 This standardized approach, however, led to disparities 
within particular localities. Different parts of the New Orleans area, 
for instance, are at higher risk from hurricanes than others. Because 
suburban areas across the Mississippi River from New Orleans are 
not at risk from Lake Pontchartrain, they face a 1 in 500 risk of 
flooding from a storm surge in a given year, whereas the downtown 
polder fronting the lake faced a 1 in 300 risk just prior to Hurricane 
Katrina. Likewise, the areas in the two polders to the east of the 
Industrial Canal, which were at risk from a storm surge flowing up the 
MRGO Canal, faced an annual risk of between 1 in 200 (according to 
the Corps analysis) and 1 in 100 (according to an analysis undertaken 
by a former Corps engineer who is now a private consultant). 
The Corps’ chief engineer for the New Orleans district, Al 
Naomi, questions the Corps’ authority to take these varying risk 
levels into account in planning for future storm protections. In his 
view, Congress has mandated that all areas in the entire region be 
protected from the same model storm. Thus, the levees in place 
throughout the city prior to Hurricane Katrina were designed to 
withstand a storm surge of 11.5 feet, ignoring the fact that some areas 
in the region are likely to encounter storm surges of that magnitude 
much more frequently than others. As we have discussed, the 
Berkeley/ASCE study concluded that the storm surge along the 
MRGO Canal exceeded the levees by as much as 10–15 feet, even 
though the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop any 
of the levees in the downtown polder.132 Building higher levees in the 
areas that are, for geographical reasons, subject to more frequent 
 
 130. Id. at 12. 
 131. Id. at 1; see also id. at 2 (describing the SPH as being developed “to provide generalized 
hurricane specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically for use in 
planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection 
works”). 
 132. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
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storm surges would, according to Naomi, violate the Corps’ legal 
mandate. In his view, Congress would have to authorize such 
variation specifically in legislation before the Corps could take it into 
account in designing future levees.133 
Deciding how to define and implement equity concerns within 
the natural disaster context is a daunting task.134 Should regulators 
seek to equalize the probabilistic risk that individuals face, or the 
amount of public money spent on protection per individual? To what 
extent should the seemingly voluntary choices of individuals to live in 
particularly vulnerable areas factor into the public policy assessment? 
How should disaster planning take account of the socioeconomic 
differences between, say, Trent Lott, whose historic oceanfront home 
in Mississippi was destroyed by Katrina, and the thousands of 
poverty-stricken New Orleans residents whose homes also were 
known to be located in areas of great vulnerability?135 These are vital 
moral and political questions that in Katrina’s aftermath receive little 
attention from the Corps or from Congress, perhaps in part because 
the SPH provides an unwarranted sense that relevant geographical 
variations already have been accounted for. 
Over time, moreover, the SPH seems to have acquired an even 
stronger presumption of normativity, being described frequently in 
Corps documents and other proceedings as the most severe storm 
that the government “reasonably” or “practicably” should guard 
against when designing hurricane protection projects. Thus, the SPH 
came to represent not only a method for comparative assessment of 
storm risks across geographic areas, but also a design standard that 
carries its own implicit assurance of optimality: 
• “The SPH is intended as a practicable expression of the 
maximum degree of protection that should be sought as a 
 
 133. McQuaid, supra note 108. 
 134. Matthew D. Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons 
from Environmental Policy Analysis, 56 DUKE L.J. 1, 7, 11–12, 29 (2006). 
 135. See Joe Johns, Sen. Lott’s Home Destroyed by Katrina, CNN.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/30/katrina.lott (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). A recurring 
problem in natural disaster policy is that private insurance markets are ill-equipped to provide 
ex ante risk-spreading services given the enormous degree of uncertainty and loss correlation 
that characterize major catastrophes, while public officials are incapable of resisting the demand 
for ex post disaster relief and compensation. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The 
Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE 
RISK 307, 333–39 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). Without a much stronger ex ante public role, 
therefore, the country is likely to continue to experience a cycle of imprudent (or practically 
involuntary) private decisionmaking followed by costly public bailout. 
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general rule in the planning and design of coastal structures 
for communities where protection of human life and 
destruction of property is involved.”136 
• “An SPH is one that may be expected from the most severe 
combination of meteorological conditions that are considered 
reasonably characteristic of the region.”137 
• “The project has been designed to afford complete 
protection from the occurrence of the largest probable storm 
(SPH) that can reasonably be expected in the region. . . . 
Probability of occurrence of hurricanes having a greater 
magnitude than the SPH are too remote to warrant practical 
consideration.”138 
• “The project is designed to protect against the ‘standard 
project hurricane’ moving on the most critical track. Only a 
combination of hydrologic and meteorologic circumstances 
anomalous to the region could produce higher stages. The 
probability of such a combination occurring is, for all 
practical purposes, nil.”139 
• “[The SPH] was expected to have a frequency of occurrence 
of once in about 200 years, and represented the most severe 
combination of meteorological conditions considered 
reasonably characteristic for the region.”140 
• “To identify a level of risk a given area faces, we do 
engineering and an economic analysis and come to an 
optimum solution for a level of protection.”141 
By tracing the SPH back to its origins, however, one finds strong 
basis for doubting the wisdom of this gradual normative reification of 
the design standard. To begin with, the SPH is obviously only as 
 
 136. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3. 
 137. U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN, LOUISIANA, AND VICINITY 
HURRICANE PROTECTION PLAN I-2 (1974). 
 138. Id. at VIII-5. 
 139. Id. at VIII-11. 
 140. GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 4. 
 141. John McQuaid & Bill Walsh, Warnings to Beef up New Orleans’ ‘60s-Era Levees 
Unheeded, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 2, 2005, available at http://www.newhousenews. 
com/archive/mcquaid090205.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (quoting Gen. Carl Strock, Army 
Corps chief of engineers) (emphasis added). Statements such as these recall the claim of the 
Corps’ Chief of Engineers in 1926—one year before the devastating Mississippi River flood that 
remains one of the country’s worst-ever natural disasters—that the lower Mississippi River 
levee system would “prevent the destructive effects of floods.” Moss, supra note 135, at 314 
(internal citation omitted). 
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reliable as the data it is built upon. The original SPH model, which 
appeared in National Hurricane Research Program Report No. 33 in 
1959, was built using data on all Atlantic tropical storms from 1900 to 
1956 that reached hurricane intensity at some point during their 
lifetimes.142 As the authors of the 1959 report acknowledged, much of 
the data used was unreliable, given the great imprecision of the 
available measurement technology. In particular, for much of the data 
the researchers had to extrapolate from land-based measurements in 
order to determine an estimate for off-shore storm pressure, because 
it was not until later in the twentieth century that scientists began 
using aircraft to measure storm pressure offshore. 
Even assuming valid measurements, however, the fifty-seven-
year record143 was quite limited in scope—containing only twenty-two 
storms in total for Zone B, the geographic area that included New 
Orleans—and was obviously insufficient to generate a statistically 
significant rendering of the overall distribution of potential storms 
from a multi-century perspective.144 The researchers attempted to 
extrapolate from the existing data by, first, calculating the cumulative 
number of storms that had appeared during the observation period at 
or below various levels of pressure (see Figure 3). This measure was 
then converted to a 100-year index simply by linearly stretching the 
data out from fifty-six to one hundred years. Finally, the data were 
plotted on normal distribution graph paper with the idea that, if the 
observed data appeared to fall into a straight line, then one could 
conclude that hurricane frequency follows a normal distribution and, 
therefore, that extrapolationg to longer return periods could be 
accomplished simply by following the observed trend line (see Figure 
4). 
 
 142. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3. 
 143. Id. at 1. 
 144. See HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3–4 (“Because of the 
manner in which the statistics of the [Central Pressure Index] were developed the 100-year CPI 
at any point on the Atlantic coast, say x, must be interpreted as the CPI value which may be 
expected to occur once in 100 years, on the average, at some point in a 300 n. mi. zone centered 
at x.” (internal citation omitted)). Even with respect to the data that were available, one of the 
more severe storms in the geographic zone containing New Orleans was listed in the table, but a 
footnote disclosed that the storm was not used in the construction of the SPH because the 
frequency index had already been calculated by the time the storm occurred. 
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Figure 4.  Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone B at Various 
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There may be reason to doubt these assumptions. Looking at 
Zone A—which included Florida and areas east of New Orleans (see 
Figure 5)—one observes that, in addition to the much sharper slope 
of the pressure data, at least one recorded storm lies far outside the 
normal distribution trend. Of course, that is just one storm and it is 
very difficult to say whether it represents a one hundred, five 
hundred, or ten thousand year storm. But that is precisely the point: 
with such a small sample, there is really not much that empirically 
supports the assumption that storm intensity will follow a normal 
distribution. Instead, the decision to extrapolate linearly is one that 
depended on a relatively unexamined conviction that Gulf storm 
behavior follows the tidy world of classical mathematics. It may well, 
of course, but it may also represent what Professor Dan Farber has 
called the world of “probabilities behaving badly,” a world in which 
complex, adaptive systems are characterized not by normal 
probability distributions, but by power law distributions in which 
extreme events appear with a surprising regularity.145 
Figure 5.  Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone A at Various 


















 145. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152–55 (2003). 
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Along those lines, consider a few facts from the 2005 Atlantic 
hurricane season: 
• Twenty-seven Atlantic storms were named during 2005, the 
most on record, shattering the previous record of twenty-one 
from 1933. For the first time, meteorologists had to reach 
into the Greek alphabet for additional storm names. 
• Fifteen hurricanes were observed, breaking the old record of 
twelve set in 1969. 
• 2005 saw the most Category Five storms ever recorded in one 
season in the Atlantic basin (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). 
• Wilma became the strongest hurricane on record in the 
Atlantic basin, as measured by barometric pressure. Three of 
the six strongest hurricanes on record occurred in 2005. 
• Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds of 125 
mph and a minimum central pressure of 27.13 inches, the 
third lowest on record at landfall behind Hurricane Camille 
from 1969 and the Labor Day Hurricane that struck the 
Florida Keys in 1935.146 
• Katrina was the costliest U.S. hurricane on record. In 
addition, the overall season tally for damage was the costliest 
in U.S. history. 
• Hurricane Vince became the first known instance of a 
tropical cyclone making landfall in Spain. 
• Hurricane Delta became only the sixth hurricane on record 
in December since 1851. 
• Tropical cyclone Zeta became the longest-lived tropical 
cyclone ever recorded in January. 
These data are, of course, merely suggestive, but they highlight 
the critical question facing disaster planners of whether the classical 
scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear 
biophysical behavior is appropriate in a world of complexity and 
climate change.147 Even putting aside these problems of model 
uncertainty, however, one still faces the basic decision of how 
 
 146. See also GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 5 (reporting that 
at landfall Katrina had a central barometric pressure of 27.17 inches and a windspeed of 140 
mph). 
 147. One engineer who examined the New Orleans levee system in 2002 concluded that 
“risks may be significantly higher than the [C]orps maintains—perhaps double—on the east side 
along levees protecting eastern New Orleans, the Lower 9th Ward, Arabi and Chalmette.” 
McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting engineering consultant Lee Butler). 
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conservative to be in setting the benchmark for the SPH. The 1959 
researchers focused on central barometric pressure and constructed a 
table reflecting the lowest central pressure index that one would 
expect at various geographic locations with an annual probability of 1 
percent. In other words, they chose the 100-year return period for 
central pressure, as estimated using their admittedly limited data 
sample and their contestable extrapolation technique. Figure 6 shows 
the resulting values at various geographic locations throughout the 
Gulf. For New Orleans, the 100-year estimate was 27.60 inches. 
Again, the SPH was not equivalent to a 100-year storm, because 
central pressure was then interpolated with other variables in a way 
that tended to make the SPH more severe at any given point than a 
100-year storm. How much more, however, is hard to say because the 
SPH depends on location-specific combinations of these variables. 
That is why the New Orleans levee system was frequently described 
as having been designed to guard against something like a 200- to 300-
year storm. 
Figure 6.  Geographic Variation of Average Frequency per 100 Years 
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Still, why anchor on a 100-year central pressure index, rather 
than 500 or 10,000 years? As the Corps noted in its 1972 revision of 
the SPH, this decision to hinge determination of the SPH on a 100-
year central pressure index return period was essentially an 
“arbitrary” one when considered from the scientific perspective.148 
This is not to say that the original analysts were unjustified in 
choosing a 100-year return period for central pressure or that some 
other period was obviously more appropriate. It is simply to say that 
the question was not a purely technical one.149 One can find clues as to 
those nontechnical considerations in contemporaneous descriptions 
of the SPH model, where commentators describe the model as being 
used to project the worst storm that is “economically [] justified” to 
guard against.150 In fact, some Corps economists at the time believed 
that the SPH was too cautious, and that a less severe storm should be 
used as the benchmark for disaster planning and prevention. 
This murky blending of science and policy continued in the much 
more elaborate and technical 1979 overhaul of the SPH. In this 
report, the SPH was changed so that the critical pressure parameter 
was derived not from the 100-year lowest expected pressure, but from 
the average of the seven lowest actually observed storms (see Figure 
7). 
 
 148. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3. 
 149. Even on narrow economic grounds, the choice of a 100-year return period for natural 
disaster planning might be questioned: Studies suggest, for instance, that a large majority (66 
percent to 83 percent) of losses from floods and hurricane winds come from events with 
recurrence intervals less frequent than the 100-year flood. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane 
Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing about Wise Governmental 
Decisions for Hazardous Areas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2006, at 171, 177. 
Again, though, it bears noting that the SPH does not strictly speaking represent a 100-year 
storm. See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text. 
 150. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9. 
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Figure 7.  Critical Pressure Derived from Average of Seven Lowest 


















This procedure may seem to be an improvement over the 
arbitrary selection of a 100-year low, but it still leaves unanswered the 
question, why not take the lowest five storms, or the single lowest 
storm, or even the single lowest storm with an additional safety 
margin included? In fact, the researchers did something quite the 
opposite in that they excluded the two worst observed storms from 
their seven lowest storm index: Hurricane Camille from 1969, and the 
Labor Day storm of 1935. The reasons provided for this exclusion are 
somewhat obscure in the report: “Our decision was based on the idea 
that these two hurricanes contained extremely low po’s resulting in 
sustained wind speeds that were not reasonably characteristic of the 
northern gulf coast and the Florida Keys.”151 
 
 151. RICHARD W. SCHWERDT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA 
TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 23, METEOROLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR STANDARD PROJECT 
HURRICANE AND PROBABLE MAXIMUM HURRICANE WIND FIELDS, GULF AND EAST COASTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 143 (1979); see also id. (“These two hurricanes are much more severe 
than any other in the gulf and are therefore not ‘reasonably characteristic.’”); id. at 2 (“By 
reasonably characteristic is meant that only a few hurricanes of record over a large region have 
had more extreme values of the meteorological parameters.”). 
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To be sure, excluding outlier data is standard practice for much 
statistical analysis, yet the move seems inappropriate in the context of 
natural disaster planning. The extreme tails of a distribution in this 
context may be precisely the areas of most interest and concern.152 
After all, the two storms excluded—Camille and the Labor Day 
storm—were the only two on record with a lower central pressure 
than Katrina. The subjective nature of the data-trimming judgment is 
implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in the technical report, when the 
analysts recommend use of an alternative, much more conservative 
measure—the probable maximum hurricane—for disaster planning 
“in locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a 
threat to the public health and safety from a hurricane-induced 
accident at a nuclear power plant.”153 Why not use this higher 
standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power 
plants? As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide 
protection against the probable maximum hurricane would, in most 
locations, be economically unjustified.”154 Thus, loaded into the SPH 
model again is an implicit cost-benefit calculation, one that prevents 
policymakers from asking directly whether an extreme event is worth 
guarding against simply by excluding the possibility that such an event 
will occur. 
Marshalling support for current public investment in long-term 
disaster prevention and mitigation projects is a political challenge of 
the highest magnitude. As Professor Kenneth Boulding once wryly 
noted, “It seems to be very hard to organize a long-run crisis.”155 
Given this difficulty, one advantage of the conventional return period 
approach to describing flood and storm protection projects is its ready 
accessibility to nonexpert audiences.156 For instance, when the Dutch 
 
 152. Farber, supra note 145, at 155. 
 153. SCHWERDT ET AL., supra note 151, at 5. 
 154. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9. The new conservative approach of taking seven of the 
lowest storms on record did result in a further revision downward of the New Orleans SPH 
central pressure measure, from 27.36 to 27.30. Nevertheless, Katrina made landfall with a 
pressure of 27.13 inches—an intensity that was clearly foreseeable to the designers of the SPH 
model, as a comparison of the SPH and the Probable Maximum Hurricane estimates for New 
Orleans demonstrates. 
 155. Kenneth E. Boulding, Spaceship Earth Revisited, in VALUING THE EARTH: 
ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 311, 311 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 
1993). 
 156. As cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has shown, individuals appear to process 
risk information much more reliably when it is presented in frequency rather than probability 
terms. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in 
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suffered a devastating storm in 1953 that killed two thousand people, 
the nation embarked on a thirty-year plan to protect the country 
against the worst storm that could be expected in ten thousand 
years.157 Similarly, when a massive Mississippi River flood in 1927 
killed several hundred individuals, displaced over five hundred 
thousand, and destroyed property worth some $3 billion (in 1993 
dollars),158 Congress and the Corps developed an especially robust 
Mississippi River flood protection system that was designed to 
withstand an 800-year flood, some five hundred years more forward-
looking than the LPVHPP.159 By most reports, the Mississippi River 
system performed extremely well during Hurricane Katrina despite 
storm surges that reached 15 to 20 feet along river stretches below 
New Orleans.160 
Did the relative opacity of the SPH prevent the development of 
political support for a more robust hurricane protection system along 
the lines of the Mississippi River system? Almost certainly not. As the 
GAO reported in 1982, state and local sponsors in New Orleans 
repeatedly “recommended that the Corps lower its design standards 
to provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a 
hurricane whose intensity might occur once every 100 years rather 
than building a project to withstand a once in 200- to 300-year 
occurrence.”161 Still, over time, more widely comprehensible 
protection standards might help to overcome the apparent reluctance 
of political constituencies to support long-term, intergenerational 
disaster planning. As of 2006, the Association of State Floodplain 
Managers advocates a 500-year storm level of protection for urban 
 
RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 284 (K.I. Manktelow & 
D.E. Over eds., 1993); Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence: An Adaptation for Frequencies, 
in THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 9, 11–15 (Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Colin Allen eds., 1998); 
Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: 
Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 697–98 (1995); Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make 
Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases,” 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83 
(1991). 
 157. Moore, supra note 74. 
 158. Moss, supra note 135, at 308. 
 159. As one expert put it: “The city is exposed to as much as four times the risk of hurricane 
flooding as it is to river flooding. . . . That’s always been an odd issue to me. Why would the 
government think that water from the lake is less dangerous than water from the river[?]” 
McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting Louisiana State University engineering 
professor, Joseph Suhayda). 
 160. Marshall, supra note 7. 
 161. 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. I at 9 (emphasis added). 
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areas and critical facilities.162 The wisdom of such a standard depends 
in part on technical engineering and economic factors, but it also 
depends critically on the public’s attitude toward risk, uncertainty, 
and intergenerational obligation. Rather than highlight such concerns 
for public scrutiny and deliberation, the SPH seems to have buried 
them within a confidently expressed, but ultimately illusory assurance 
of “reasonableness” and “optimality.” 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Since the Flood Control Act of 1936, Army Corps of Engineers 
project funding has been limited by Congress to those projects that 
have demonstrated benefits in excess of costs.163 This early form of 
regulatory cost-benefit analysis was not originally associated with a 
perceived need for agency discipline, as it is today, but rather with a 
conviction that science, empiricism, and expert judgment could lead 
to wise policymaking.164 Over time, such New Deal optimism became 
replaced by a more skeptical view of government, and the Army 
Corps in particular seemed to attract scrutiny from interests all along 
the political spectrum who began to view the statutory cost-benefit 
requirement as a valuable check on the otherwise overreaching 
impulses of the Corps. In part for reasons such as this, a number of 
prominent scholars and officials today regard the use of formal cost-
benefit analysis to be of critical importance to the future of 
environmental, health, and safety regulation.165 
The history of the LPVHPP planning process, however, suggests 
that the cost-benefit requirement may have had undesirable 
 
 162. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 163. Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)). 
 164. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN 
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 148–89 (1995). 
 165. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 139 (2004); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION, at ix 
(2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 129–48 
(2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at ix 
(2002); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 
165, 168 (1999); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 222 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & 
Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. 
REV. 364, 366–67 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification and 
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1157 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000). 
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distortionary effects on Corps decisionmaking. A report in the 
Washington Post, for instance, claimed that the critical normative 
judgments described in the previous Section regarding the 
construction of the SPH were driven in part by concern that the cost-
benefit constraint facing Corps’ projects would not justify higher 
levels of storm protection.166 In fact, an Army Corps official in 1978 
reported that economic cost-benefit analyses at the time were 
prescribing an even lower level of protection than the SPH.167 No 
doubt these economic conclusions were driven in part by the standard 
use of a 3.25 percent discount rate in evaluating monetized projects’ 
costs and benefits,168 a procedure that scholars have shown to reflect a 
clumsy and inadequate way of addressing questions of 
intergenerational equity, particularly in the face of very long-range 
planning of the sort implicated by disaster policy.169 
 
 166. The article states: 
The Corps was required to recommend the project with the most economic benefits—
no matter who received them—compared to the cost to taxpayers. It could not 
consider whether the benefits would be fairly distributed, or the value of wetlands the 
projects might destroy, or even the value of protecting people from death. So the 
Corps settled on 200-year protection from storms, a sharp contrast to the 800-year 
protection from the river. 
Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, The Slow Drowning of New Orleans, WASH. POST, Oct. 
9, 2005, at A1. 
 167. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 16 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III, 
District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans) (“Even though economists may, 
and in this case, did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of project 
benefits to project costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project 
hurricane.”); see also SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR 
AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 89–90 (2006) (quoting 
Col. Early Rush, Corps District Commander for New Orleans, testifying at a 1978 hearing). 
 168. See U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., supra note 137, at VIII-12. 
 169. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 179–80 (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa 
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2002); Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in 
JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 144–61 (Peter Laslett & James S. 
Fishkin eds., 1992); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1911 (1999); Lisa 
Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999); Lisa 
Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2027–28 (1999); Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2068–69 (1998); 
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 580–85 (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and 
Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 728–29 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, 
and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–36 (2001); Richard B. Norgaard 
& Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: 
THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 88, 97–98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991). 
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It also bears noting that the Corps typically does not take 
potential loss of life into account when conducting cost-benefit 
analyses of its projects. According to the GAO, the Corps’ guidance 
(Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the issue 
of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans, but 
they are not required to formally estimate the number of lives saved 
or lost as a potential effect of a project.170 In situations where 
historical data exist, the analysts have the option to estimate the 
number of persons potentially affected by a project and include this 
number as an additional factor for the consideration of 
decisionmakers. Hence, a high cost project that has few economic 
benefits, but which would save many lives, may not pass the cost-
benefit test because the Corps does not include the lives saved as an 
explicitly monetized benefit. 
In practice, this exclusion of saved human lives from cost-benefit 
calculation may have contributed to the Corps’ apparent practice of 
liberally including prospects for private development as part of its 
flood control and hurricane protection projects. Because the Corps 
did not include saved human lives or ecological values in its cost-
benefit analyses, the bulk of the identified benefit from hurricane 
protection tended to come from the safeguarding of real and personal 
property.171 Thus, in order to generate a higher regulatory “budget” 
for project planning purposes, the Corps seems naturally to have been 
tempted to design projects in ways that generated easily identifiable 
and monetizable property protection benefits, even if that meant the 
earmarking of wetlands for future development that might otherwise 
have remained in their natural, storm surge-dampening state.172 
Indeed, a key aspect of the local opposition to the LPVHPP centered 
on the question of whether the Corps had gone beyond protecting 
existing and anticipated land developments to actively promoting new 
 
 170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS: IMPROVED ANALYSIS 
OF COSTS AND BENEFITS NEEDED FOR SACRAMENTO FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT 20 n.13 
(2003). 
 171. See U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., supra note 137, at title page (reporting only property 
damage prevention, land intensification, and redevelopment as itemized annual benefits); id. at 
VIII-21 (“Environmental losses were not evaluated in dollar terms.”). 
 172. See id. at ii (“Indirectly, the plan will hasten urbanization and industrialization of 
valuable marshes and swamps by providing for further flood protection and land reclamation.”); 
see also id. at VIII-27 (“Several areas would be rendered more suitable for urban use as a result 
of the project works. This effect will be reflected in increases in value of these lands, which 
increases are called ‘enhancement benefits,’ since they do represent additions to the Gross 
National Product.”). 
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development that would not have occurred but for the Corps’ 
activities. As one analyst noted, “[a]n extraordinary 79% [of the net 
benefits from the LPVHPP] were to come from new development 
that would now be feasible with the added protection provided by the 
improved levee system.”173 
The use of cost-benefit analysis for purposes of environmental, 
health, and safety regulation is, of course, highly controversial and a 
full treatment of the subject is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
Even if the Corps had included human health and environmental 
values within its cost-benefit calculations, theoretically and 
normatively difficult questions would have remained regarding how 
to monetize those values and how to account for their intertemporal 
distribution.174 What the Katrina planning process more narrowly 
seems to show, however, is yet another way in which cost-benefit 
analysis in practice leads to the very kinds of political and analytical 
distortions that the procedure is designed to guard against. For 
example, some observers of the regulatory process (including one of 
the authors of this Article) have advocated greater use of 
retrospective cost analysis as a check on what appear to be systematic 
overestimates of industry regulatory compliance costs in prospective 
cost-benefit analysis—a distortion that leads to unduly modest levels 
of investment in environmental, health, and safety regulation.175 
Similarly, in the Katrina context, the failure to account adequately for 
 
 173. Burby, supra note 149, at 174 (citing 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20). This 
conflation of protection and promotion purposes appears to be common within flood control 
and hurricane protection planning. See RAYMOND J. BURBY & STEVEN P. FRENCH, FLOOD 
PLAIN LAND USE MANAGEMENT: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 146–47 (1985) (finding a positive 
correlation between community flood controls works and the amount of new development 
taking place in flood hazard areas after flood control works are completed). 
 174. See supra note 169. 
 175. Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998–2000 (2002); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 41–52 (2005) (using retrospective estimates to validate cost-
benefit projections prepared prior to regulation). Of course, to the extent that hindsight analysis 
of regulatory costs involves speculation about how regulated entities would have addressed the 
hazards of the regulated activity in the absence of the regulatory intervention (e.g., to avoid 
potential tort liability), the value of retrospective cost assessments may prove illusory. It should 
be noted, however, that many regulatory interventions address environmental hazards, the costs 
of which are relatively easily externalized, and health hazards, the costs of which are unevenly 
internalized by tort law. In these situations, the assumption that the regulated entities would 
have taken little or no action to address such hazards may yield a fairly accurate regulatory cost 
assessment. 
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM 
2006] DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS? 231 
the lifesaving purposes of hurricane protection seems to have led the 
Corps not only to understate the monetary justification for hurricane 
protection, but also to promote private land development schemes 
that may well have been counterproductive from the perspective of 
guarding against storm surges. 
C. Priority Setting 
The Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting 
priorities for its projects. Once the Corps has determined that the 
benefits of a proposed project exceed its costs, the Corps leaves it to 
Congress to decide through the appropriations process those projects 
that receive funding and those that do not.176 The Corps’ reluctance in 
this regard is somewhat understandable, given the agency’s desire to 
appear to be a politically neutral, expert-driven body, rather than the 
self-aggrandizing pork processor it often is depicted to be in more 
cynical political discussion.177 Yet the Corps’ relative agnosticism on 
priorities deprives congressional decisionmakers of crucial contextual 
information regarding the relative seriousness of proposed projects. 
As one observer noted, “[s]aving New Orleans gets no more emphasis 
than draining wetlands to grow corn and soybeans.”178 
The Corps’ agnosticism in this regard also encourages piecemeal, 
project-by-project congressional decisionmaking, when a more 
comprehensive approach is required that integrates flood control, 
hurricane protection, coastal restoration, ecosystem preservation, and 
mitigation projects within a single framework. The much-criticized 
MRGO Canal, for instance, might have appeared to be a far less 
attractive project had it been analyzed as part of a more direct and 
inclusive effort to balance economic development with human safety 
and the environment. As Professor Oliver Houck has noted, the 
MRGO costs taxpayers thousands of dollars per ship passing while it 
has destroyed 26,000 acres of cypress hardwood and marsh. As a 
result, “environmentalists have been trying to get [it] closed for 25 
 
 176. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Money Flowed to Questionable Projects, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (observing that, “more than any other federal agency, the Corps is 
controlled by Congress; its $4.7 billion civil works budget consists almost entirely of ‘earmarks’ 
inserted by individual legislators”). 
 177. See, e.g., id. (“Despite a series of independent investigations criticizing Army Corps 
construction projects as wasteful pork-barrel spending, Louisiana’s representatives have kept 
bringing home the bacon.”). 
 178. Id. (quoting Tim Searchinger, a senior attorney at Environmental Defense). 
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years.”179 Thus, for a variety of reasons beyond just its potentially risk-
enhancing qualities with respect to hurricanes, the MRGO seems to 
represent indefensible public policy. The full egregiousness of the 
project, however, is difficult to perceive when its implications are 
analyzed only in a piecemeal fashion. 
Moreover, the polder containing the Ninth Ward and parts of St. 
Bernard Parish that flooded during Hurricane Katrina also was 
inundated in 1965 during Hurricane Betsy, a fast-moving Category 
Three hurricane. Officials at the time suggested that the MRGO 
Canal had acted like a funnel, channeling the storm surge from the 
Gulf of Mexico into New Orleans.180 A Times-Picayune article in 2002 
later noted that “[p]roponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it 
has evolved into a shotgun pointed straight at New Orleans, should a 
major hurricane approach from that angle.”181 Levee analysis and 
sophisticated modeling exercises have led some experts to conclude 
that this very shotgun fired during Hurricane Katrina, with 
devastating results.182 Although it is certainly possible that the polder 
would have flooded even if the MRGO Canal had not existed in 1965 
and again in 2005, policymakers could reasonably conclude that filling 
in the MRGO Canal now would eliminate a potential cause of future 
flooding.183 
In order to appreciate these multidimensional implications of the 
MRGO Canal, one must move beyond narrowly framed modes of 
policy analysis and embrace something more like the emerging 
sustainable development paradigm, in which the many determinants 
 
 179. See, e.g., Recovering from Katrina and Rita: Environmental Governance Lessons 
Learned and Applied, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,139, 10,150 (2006) (statement of Oliver Houck). 
 180. Karen Turni, Upgrade of Levees Proposed by Corps, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 12, 1998, 
at A1. 
 181. McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18. 
 182. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Levees Washed Away Along MRGO and St. Bernard Parish, Army Corps Say, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.nola.com/weblogs/print.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-
Picayune/archives/print079451.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (“If we didn’t have Mr. Go, we 
would have had some problems, but we wouldn’t have had 30,000 homes flooded.” (quoting 
State Senator Walter Boasso)); John Schwartz & Andrew C. Revkin, Levee Reconstruction Will 
Restore, but Not Improve, Defenses in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A22 (quoting 
Dr. Craig E. Colten of Louisiana State University, who advocates shutting down the MRGO 
Canal). In 1998, the St. Bernard parish Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding that 
the MRGO be closed. Grunwald, supra note 75. The Corps of Engineers has stopped dredging 
the MRGO Canal, and it may recommend that it be shut down. John McQuaid et al., Protecting 
the Area from Another Major Storm is Crucial to Getting New Orleans Back on Its Feet . . . But 
How?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 25, 2005, at 1. 
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of human well-being and environmental sustainability are treated as 
aspects of a single complex, but integrated public policy framework.184 
It makes little sense, for instance, to talk about the optimal post-
Katrina hurricane protection plan for New Orleans without also 
discussing wetlands, housing and transportation, climate change and 
energy, and a host of other policy areas that undoubtedly and 
significantly will impact the very parameters that also guide hurricane 
protection planning. Such decisionmaking will not lend itself to 
formulaic resolution. Accordingly, it is by nature pluralistic and 
messy. Yet it also appears to be the most reliable way that disasters 
such as Katrina can be anticipated and avoided in an increasingly 
intertwined and fragile world. 
CONCLUSION 
Familiar aphorisms aside, hindsight is not necessarily 20/20: The 
counterfactual nature of the hindsight causation analysis inevitably 
requires the analyst to create a hypothetical world in which 
alternatives are chosen that were not in fact adopted in the real 
world. As with the related “cause-in-fact” inquiry in tort law, this 
inquiry invites a great deal of speculation. When the suggested cause 
of a catastrophic failure is remote in time and when many other 
actions that are also relevant to the causal analysis intervene or could 
have intervened between the suggested cause and the failure, the 
opportunity for analysts to speculate—or manipulate—becomes very 
real. Accordingly, how we sort among many uncertain counterfactual 
worlds to identify responsible causal agents says as much about our 
politics and our culture as it does about our science.185 
In that respect, attempts by politicians and pundits in Katrina’s 
aftermath to pin the levee failure in New Orleans on NEPA litigation 
do not speak well of our politics and our culture. Hindsight analysis 
provides little reason to believe that a barrier project of the sort 
envisioned in 1976 would have prevented the Hurricane Katrina 
storm surge from breaching the levees along the 17th Street and 
London Avenue canals, as critics of NEPA have argued. Looking 
 
 184. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2113–14 (2005) (advocating a reexamined sustainable development 
paradigm). 
 185. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 
(2003) (describing the manner in which the perception of risk and the attribution of blame are 
freighted with cultural meaning). 
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM 
234 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:179 
forward, policymakers are well advised to examine what exactly 
caused the levees along the outfall canals to fail, taking action to 
rebuild or fortify those levees prior to investing in an expensive 
barrier project. Once that remedial work is accomplished, a more 
expansive barrier project may still be warranted, and it may even 
need to be substantially more protective than the project envisioned 
in 1976, including a seagate at the point at which the MRGO Canal 
intersects with the Intercoastal Waterway to provide equitable levels 
of protection to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish.186 Any such 
project, however, should only be contemplated with the same 
commitment to integrated, environmentally-informed decisionmaking 
that has characterized NEPA since its adoption in 1969. 
According to some estimates, a coastal protection system capable 
of guarding against a Category Four to Five storm for New Orleans 
would cost $2.5 billion and require ten to twenty years of 
construction.187 As hindsight analysis of the LPVHPP planning 
process shows, deciding whether to undertake such a project can 
never be reduced entirely to a technocratic exercise. Just as judgment 
and discretion inhere in the attribution of fault for a causally 
overdetermined disaster, so too does the prediction of harm from 
inherently complex and uncertain systems always require the exercise 
of collective agency and responsibility. To be sure, the tools of risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis do provide vital information for 
public policymaking. They must, however, be deployed with a degree 
of sensitivity regarding their limitations and a vigilant awareness of 
the need for moral and political judgments that go beyond the 
parameters of the formalized analytical frameworks. 
The LPVHPP planning process suggests that such sensitivity and 
awareness may have been placed in jeopardy by overzealous 
confidence in the powers of technical decisionmaking apparatuses.188 
 
 186. McQuaid et al., supra note 183. 
 187. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NEW ORLEANS LEVEES AND FLOODWALLS: HURRICANE 
DAMAGE PROTECTION 6 (2005). These estimates are likely vastly optimistic. See Peter 
Whoriskey & Spencer S. Shu, Levee Repair Costs Triple, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at A1 
(noting that the Bush administration had raised cost estimates for rebuilding the New Orleans 
levee system to “federal standards” to $10 billion in light of better understanding of wetlands 
loss, subsidence, and hurricane frequency and intensity). 
 188. PORTER, supra note 164, at 8 (“[Q]uantitative estimates sometimes are given 
considerable weight even when nobody defends their validity with real conviction. . . . 
Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends 
authority to officials who have very little of their own.”). 
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In the case of the SPH, a sophisticated meteorological model tended 
to obscure important decisions regarding the treatment of highly 
uncertain but potentially catastrophic risks to present and future New 
Orleans residents, suggesting a degree of normative agreement 
lurking behind the concept of “reasonably characteristic” hurricanes 
that was almost certainly absent in actuality. In the case of cost-
benefit analysis, the Corps’ approach to economic project evaluation 
seemed both to stack the deck against long-range investment in 
disaster prevention and mitigation, and to promote a form of 
“mission creep” in the Corps planning activities toward easily 
monetizable benefits. 
In sum, neither the blame game nor the numbers game is up to 
the task of formulating sound and ethical natural disaster policy. 
Instead, analysts should set out the uncertainties of both hindsight 
and prospective analyses in a way that is easily accessible to 
decisionmakers and the public, so that the full challenge of long-term 
intergenerational risk regulation will be highlighted for consideration, 
rather than obscured from view. Focusing narrowly on any single 
parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to 
dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety 
decisionmaking—whether the parameter is a “standard project 
hurricane” when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally 
mythical “lawsuit that sunk New Orleans” when attempting to 
allocate responsibility for a disaster some forty years later. 
